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INTRODUCTION  
Oil and gas development is testing and defining the boundaries of local 
government authority and autonomy as concerned municipal entities and 
citizens seek to limit oil and gas operations. Advances in high-volume 
hydraulic fracturing have increased domestic oil and gas production to 
historic levels.1 At the same time, national and international concerns about 
irreversible man-made global warming have focused on fossil fuel 
combustion.2 National groups opposed to continued reliance on oil and gas 
as an energy source have found willing partners in many local governments 
and their citizens, who are anxious about the local implications of drilling 
and fracking.3 Many citizens and environmental organizations coalesce 
around local environmental risks such as the potential degradation of ground 
and surface waters and air quality, seismic activity, and social and economic 
costs on the local area—including increased truck traffic, road damage, 
noise, housing shortages, and boom and bust cycles.4 Particularly in urban 
or suburban areas, voters may also perceive drilling and fracking as a threat 
to property values, aesthetics, and lifestyles. 
                                                                                                             
 1. The United States has become the largest producer of petroleum and natural 
gas in the world, surpassing Russia in natural gas production and Saudi Arabia in 
oil production. See Adam Sieminski, Presentation, Oil and Gas Outlook 14 (Oct. 
16, 2015), available at http://www.eia.gov/pressroom/presentations/sieminski 
_10162015.pdf [perma.cc/F2V7-TUD2]. 
 2. See Climate Change and President Obama’s Action Plan, WHITEHOUSE 
.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/climate-change [perma.cc/2GGM-CMWK] (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2015) (stating that carbon pollution is the biggest driver of climate 
change). 
 3. See, e.g., Fracking: Community Defense, NRDC, http://www.nrdc.org/land 
/fracking-community-defense/?gclid=Cj0KEQiAuremBRCbtr-1qJnKi-4BEiQAh0 
x08G5Ia-q4N-5_wpQYvDYFWXlAtXaquuwKRYXZB2PpnUIaAjGB8P8HAQ 
[perma.cc/72ZB-65D6] (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (“The Community Fracking 
Defense Campaign brings the grassroots power of communities facing fracking 
together with the expertise of NRDC’s policy and legal team.”). 
 4. For a discussion of various potential environmental risks and recommended 
regulatory responses, see Hanna J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing 
Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729 (2013). 
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Now that fracking has become a topic of wider public interest, at least 
to the media and the relatively informed public,5 local government efforts to 
control oil and gas operations appear to be a modern phenomenon. These 
recent efforts are, however, little more than “old wine in new bottles.” The 
Cities of Winkfield and Oxford, Kansas, adopted municipal oil and gas 
ordinances in the late 1920s that focused on the prevention of waste and the 
protection of correlative rights,6 and cases that upheld the application of 
zoning ordinances to oil and gas operations began appearing in the 1930s.7  
Because neither fracking nor the local regulation of oil and gas 
operations are particularly new,8 what has changed may be a matter of 
degree. As advances in technology unlock new resources, drilling and 
completion activities intensify in new areas that are rich in shale resources.9 
                                                                                                             
 5. Those who study oil and gas issues or work in related fields may be 
particularly aware of the media coverage, but a 2013 study concluded that the 
American populace is largely unaware of and undecided about hydraulic fracturing. See 
Hilary Boudet et al., “Fracking” Controversy and Communication: Using National 
Survey Data to Understanding Public Perceptions of Hydraulic Fracturing, 65 ENERGY 
POL’Y 57, 63 (2014), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.10.017 
[perma.cc/Z88X-VQEH]. 
 6. See Bruce M. Kramer, The State of State and Local Government Relations 
as It Impacts the Regulation of Oil and Gas Operations: Has the Shale Revolution 
Really Changed the Rules of the Game?, 29 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 69, 71–
72 (2013). 
 7. See, e.g., Anderson-Kerr, Inc. v. Van Meter, 19 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Okla. 
1933) (“The governing body of the city has a right to regulate the oil industry and 
the drilling of wells within its corporate limits or to prohibit them from being 
drilled in certain designated territory.”); Van Meter v. Westgate Oil Co., 32 P.2d 
719, 721 (Okla. 1934). 
 8. Hydraulic fracturing, meaning the use of water to fracture rock 
formations to produce oil and gas, “was first tested in 1903 and first used 
commercially in 1948.” Thomas E. Kurth, Michael J. Mazzone, Mary S. Mendoza 
& Christopher S. Kulander, American Law and Jurisprudence on Fracing, at 1, 
3, NW. PRITZKER SCH. L. (2012), https://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-
faculty/searlecenter/workingpapers/documents/Kulander_2012_Fracing_Paper.p
df [perma.cc/NN88-V7UA]. Horizontal drilling combined with slick-water 
hydraulic fracturing at sufficient pressure to commercially produce shale and 
other tight formations began around 1997 in the Barnett Shale, reinvigorating the 
oil and gas industry. See J. Lanier Yeates & Andrew M. Abrameit, Current Issues 
In Oil & Gas Shale Development, 58 ANN. INST. MIN. L. 146, 146 (2011). 
 9. See, e.g., Growth in U.S. Energy Production Outstrips Consumption Growth, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/pressroom/releases 
/press379.cfm [perma.cc/D8SH-8EFX] (describing growth in oil production from 
shale and other tight formations (Figure 1) and growth in shale gas production (Figure 
3)). 
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While local governments have historically applied locational restrictions to 
oil and gas operations under zoning ordinances,10 those governments now 
more regularly seek to ban fracking or oil and gas production altogether.11 
Many would not normally oppose local ordinances that require the use of a 
closed loop system or reasonable set-backs.12 However, a complete ban on 
hydraulic fracturing is extreme in the sense that it tends to eviscerate the oil 
and gas interest owner’s ability to produce. In recent years, domestic oil and 
gas production has focused on vast shale source rock and tight formations 
that can be accessed only using hydraulic fracturing.13 As a result, a ban on 
fracking is a relatively easy way to prohibit all oil and gas production 
without expressly prohibiting oil and gas production.14  
Furthermore, oil and gas drilling and fracking in Louisiana and 
elsewhere challenge conservative Republican principles. Conservatism has 
long promoted state-level governance over federal government power and 
control.15 Under related principles, conservatives have advocated for local 
                                                                                                             
 10. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 73. 
 11. For a collection of more than 400 local ordinances related to oil and gas 
operations or fracking, see Mary Grant, Local Resolutions Against Fracking, FOOD 
& WATER WATCH (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/insight 
/local-resolutions-against-fracking/ [perma.cc/3X2S-QCZ6]. The Author has not 
verified that all of the collected ordinances have actually passed or are in full force 
and effect. 
 12. A closed loop system is a system that allows an operator to drill a well without 
using a reserve pit. Lance Astrella & Reginald Wiemers, Closed Loop Drilling 
Systems Can Eliminate Reserve Pit Costs, OIL & GAS J. (May 27, 1996), 
http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-94/issue-22/in-this-issue/production/tech 
nology-closed-loop-drilling-systems-can-eliminate-reserve-pit-costs.html [perma.cc 
/S6D7-NKU9]. A setback for zoning purposes is a prescribed distance of a structure 
from the property line or another structure. See Setback, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/setback [perma.cc/TMR2-U56C] (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2016). 
 13. See Sieminski, supra note 1, at 4, 5. 
 14. David E. Pierce, Developing a Common Law of Hydraulic Fracturing, 72 
U. PITT. L. REV. 685, 686 (2011). Rather than prohibit fracking altogether, one 
rather ingenious local regulation prohibited fracking with fluids other than fresh 
water, which essentially makes advanced high-volume hydraulic fracturing 
impossible. See SANTA FE CNTY., N.M., ORDINANCE 2008–19, § 11.25.4 (Dec. 
10, 2008). 
 15. See Republican Party Platform of 1956, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http: 
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25838 [perma.cc/4KAH-69KY] (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2015) (“We hold that the strict division of powers and the primary 
responsibility of State and local governments must be maintained, and that the 
centralization of powers in the national Government leads to expansion of the mastery 
of our lives.”); We The People: A Restoration of Constitutional Government, GOP, 
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county and municipal self-governance over state governance.16 In 
Louisiana, these local self-governance principles manifest in a home-rule 
legal tradition.17 In recent years, however, this small government ideology 
has been flipped on its head in more conservative states, such as Louisiana 
and Texas, where urban areas lean Democratic and rural and suburban areas 
tend to lean Republican, at least in state-wide elections.18  
Modern conservatism not only promotes pushing government down 
towards the people; it also strongly predicts support for fossil fuel 
development.19 In the realm of oil and gas production, one may view the 
state as more interested in securing jobs and promoting economic activity,20 
                                                                                                             
https://www.gop.com/platform/we-the-people/ [perma.cc/PHV9-R9CG] (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2015) (Republican Party Platform). 
 16. See, e.g., Platform-Local-Government, MONT. REPUBLICAN PARTY, 
http://www .mtgop.org/index.php/about/party-platform/212-platform-local-
government.html [perma.cc/N2VC-LM3P] (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (“The 
Montana Republican Party supports efforts to return control and authority to local 
units, as the government closest and most responsive to the people.”). 
 17. See infra Part IV.A. 
 18. The political makeup of Louisiana is somewhat of an anomaly. Although 
Independents have made gains, Democrats still controlled about 73% of the 
precincts in Louisiana in the 2012 presidential election, but 65% of those precincts 
voted for republican candidate Mitt Romney for President. See Ben Myers, 
Louisiana Votes Red Even as Democrats, Republicans Lose Sway, NOLA.COM (Nov. 
4, 2014, 7:15 AM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/11/louisiana_vo 
ters_register_blue [perma.cc/8X25-XGMR]. As explained by Ed Chervenak, a 
University of New Orleans political science professor, southern Democrats—
primarily white southern Democrats—in Louisiana have tended to remain registered 
as Democrats even though voting habits have shifted towards the Republican Party 
since Ronald Reagan first ran for President. Id.; see also Wade Goodwyn, New 
Texas Governor Adds to Tension Between State, City Governments, NPR (Jan. 15, 
2015, 4:45 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/01/15/377526831/new-texas-governor-
adds-to-tension-between-state-city-governments [perma.cc/758H-USFS] (quoting 
republican Texas Governor Greg Abbot as saying “[t]he truth is, Texas is being 
California-ized with bag bans, fracking bans, tree-cutting bans” and noting “[t]he 
cries that the new governor’s battle with his cities is the height of Republican 
hypocrisy – ‘oh, sure, it’s all about local control until the Democrats are the ones in 
control’”). 
 19. Hilary Boudet et al., supra note 5, at 60. 
 20. See David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political 
Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 466–67 (2013) 
(explaining capture theory, whereby business interests can capture the regulatory 
process for their own benefit, and that agency capture may be more prevalent at 
the state level (rather than the federal level) where the political process tends to 
attract less attention). 
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and local governments as more responsive to local environmental and social 
concerns. While not all state governments necessarily under-regulate oil and 
gas activities, perceptions lead to conflicts when communities view 
themselves as entitled to a degree of local autonomy over activities such as 
oil and gas development that conflict with state-wide interests. Part I of this 
Article discusses the recent dispute over fracking in St. Tammany Parish as 
a case study illustrating such a conflict. 
Across the country, the relationship between state and local jurisdiction 
over oil and gas drilling and completion is balanced along a spectrum. At 
one extreme, the state regulates the process of drilling, but the local 
government regulates land use with an absolute veto power to ban drilling.21 
At the middle of the spectrum, the state regulates the process of drilling, and 
the local government has the power to impose traditional zoning districts or 
to impose setbacks on operations.22 However, in this situation, the local 
government lacks an outright veto of drilling operations.23 The state may or 
may not also provide additional opportunities for local governments to 
participate in state permitting.24 Further along the spectrum, the state is the 
final arbiter of both the process of drilling and the location of wells, but the 
state provides an opportunity for meaningful participation by local 
governments in the permitting process.25 Finally, at the other end of the 
spectrum, the state is the final arbiter of both the process of drilling and the 
location of wells.  
As discussed in Part II of this Article, all major producing states, to 
varying degrees, recognize the distinction between the state’s oversight of 
the drilling process (“process”) and local government’s oversight of where 
wells can be placed (“land use”). This distinction allocates control over the 
process of drilling wells to the state while reserving some control over the 
siting of wells to local governments. Even the new Texas and Oklahoma 
                                                                                                             
 21. New York and Pennsylvania are examples of this extreme. Ironically, 
both states have express preemption statutes. See infra Part II.C. 
 22. Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Oklahoma are examples of this 
structure, see infra Part II, although land use control in Texas and Oklahoma 
recently has been curtailed by new preemption statutes. See infra Part II.A–B. 
Ohio also probably falls within this category despite an express preemption statute 
that prohibits local regulation as to the location of wells. See infra Part II.C. 
 23. See infra Part II.C for the discussion of recent court decisions in Colorado 
and New Mexico striking down bans on oil and gas operations. 
 24. Additional opportunities for local government participation in well 
permitting decisions provided by Colorado are discussed in Part VI.A, infra. 
 25. This may be the new paradigm for Louisiana if its appellate courts 
recognize the duties of the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources under 
Article IX, Section 1 of the Louisiana Constitution. See infra Part VI.B. 
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preemption statutes, which were adopted in the wake of a Denton, Texas 
fracking ban, leave some land use authority vested in local governments.26 
In contrast, Louisiana operates at the far right of the spectrum. Louisiana 
statutes and court decisions, which are examined in Part III of this Article, 
deny local governments control over both process and land use decisions in 
the oil and gas context.27 
This lack of any local autonomy over the location of wells in Louisiana 
arguably conflicts with the conservative ideal of home rule that the drafters 
of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution envisioned.28 For a short period of time, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court promised a new era of strong self-government 
at the local level; however, the court quickly retreated from that promise in 
favor of deference to the state legislature when state and local interests 
collide.29 The implication is that, despite its purpose, home rule in Louisiana 
provides little promise of local self-governance over oil and gas operations. 
This premise is analyzed in Part IV of this Article. 
Despite this lack of local control in Louisiana, Part V of this Article 
argues as a normative matter that the state should have ultimate authority 
over well siting decisions due to the nature of oil and gas. In particular, the 
line between the state interest in process and land use blurs in the oil and gas 
context. State conservation agencies have a statutory mandate to prevent 
waste of minerals and protect the correlative rights of landowners that may 
be compromised by bans or zoning ordinances that prohibit oil and gas 
operations in particular locations.30 This is not, however, to say that local 
environmental and other concerns should go unheeded. 
Part VI of this Article examines two alternatives that ultimately give the 
state authority over the location of wells. The first alternative— voluntary 
compromise—only addresses substantive environmental concerns when the 
parties feel compelled to negotiate. Even without a legal mandate, however, 
the oil and gas industry may negotiate restrictions on its operations to 
preserve or enhance its social license to operate when the risks and costs of 
compliance are perceived as low. The second alternative is examined in the 
context of the recent victory by the Town of Abita Springs in its dispute with 
the state over fracking in St. Tammany Parish.31 This alternative recognizes 
the obligations of the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (“LDNR”) 
as a public trustee under the “Natural Resources Article,” Article IX, Section 
                                                                                                             
 26. See infra Part II.A–B for discussion of the new Texas and Oklahoma 
preemption statutes. 
 27. See infra Part II.B. 
 28. LA. CONST. art. VI. 
 29. See infra Part IV. 
 30. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:4 (2007 & Supp. 2015). 
 31. See infra Part VI.B. 
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1 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. This provision leaves the final 
decision for well-location approval to the state while granting local 
governments and their citizens a substantive voice in the state permitting 
process to air their environmental and local health and safety concerns.32 
Although that type of participation right does not necessarily mandate a 
particular outcome, the state should be required to analyze and address 
legitimate local concerns in its findings and conclusions before issuing 
drilling permits. That participation right is not a panacea for all concerned 
but somewhat mitigates the loss of autonomy that local governments feel 
while balancing the need for statewide uniformity and control. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE FRACKING DISPUTE IN ST. TAMMANY PARISH 
A number of residents, along with the local government of St. Tammany 
Parish, have a problem with oil and gas operations in their neighborhood.33 
On March 31, 2014, Helis Oil & Gas (“Helis”) applied to the Louisiana 
Office of Conservation (“LOC”), which is part of the Louisiana Department 
of Natural Resources (“LDNR”), to create a single drilling and production 
unit in the Tuscaloosa Marine Shale, Reservoir A, in the Lacombe Bayou 
Field, in St. Tammany Parish.34 On the day before the hearing to consider 
the unit application, St. Tammany Parish filed suit against the LOC for a 
declaratory judgment to require the LOC to give primary consideration to 
St. Tammany zoning ordinances in deciding whether to authorize formation 
of the drilling and production unit.35 The St. Tammany ordinances, adopted 
in 2006, zoned the relevant drilling area as residential, thus prohibiting 
drilling at Helis’s proposed site.36 St. Tammany also prayed for an 
injunction to prohibit the LOC’s forced pooling proceedings until the LOC 
corrected enforcement and compliance deficiencies identified in an audit 
report that the Louisiana Legislative Auditor’s Office prepared. Lastly, St. 
Tammany Parish requested a declaration that St. Tammany had the option 
to ban fracking.37 
                                                                                                             
 32. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.  
 33. See Robert Rhoden, Proposed Oil and Gas Drilling Near Mandeville 
Raises Concerns, NOLA.COM (Apr. 8, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://www.nola.com 
/politics/index.ssf/2014/04/proposed_oil_and_gas_drilling.html [perma.cc/YY44-
UFJY]. 
 34. Petition for Declaration and Injunctive Relief, St. Tammany Parish v. 
Welsh, No. 631370 (La. Dist. Ct. June 16, 2014). 
 35. Id. ¶ 37. 
 36. Id. ¶ 24. 
 37. Id. ¶ 37. 
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In response, the State argued that St. Tammany failed to state a cause of 
action.38 According to the LOC, St. Tammany’s zoning ordinances were 
preempted because the state comprehensively regulates every phase of the 
oil and gas exploration and production process and because Louisiana 
statutes expressly preempt a parish’s attempt to enforce its zoning 
ordinances where oil and gas operations are concerned.39 
Once Helis established the drilling unit, St. Tammany complained that 
the LOC violated a mandatory statutory obligation to “consider”40 the 
Parish’s zoning ordinances by approving the drilling unit in an area that the 
Parish designated as not zoned for drilling.41 The LOC argued that an 
obligation to consider a master plan did not require the state to deny the unit 
application just because the Parish prohibited drilling at the site through its 
zoning ordinances.42 Despite the ongoing lawsuit, the LOC issued Helis a 
permit to drill a 13,000-foot vertical test well.43 On May 13, 2015, District 
                                                                                                             
 38. Technically, the LOC made a peremptory exception of no cause of action 
to dismiss the lawsuit. Memorandum in Support of Conservation’s Exceptions to 
the Plaintiff’s Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, St. Tammany 
Parish v. Welsh, No. 631307 (La. Dist. Ct. July 11, 2014) [hereinafter LOC 
Response Memorandum]; see also Montalvo v. Sondes, 637 So. 2d 127, 131 (La. 
1994) (explaining peremptory exception of no cause of action). 
 39. LOC Response Memorandum, supra note 38, at 8–9. 
 40. Conservation’s Amended Exceptions to the Plaintiff’s First Supplemental 
Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, St. Tammany Parish v. Welsh, 
No. 631307 (La. Dist. Ct. Oct. 1, 2014). 
 41. First Supplemental Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 4, 
6, St. Tammany Parish v. Welsh, No. 631370 (La. Dist. Ct. Sept. 4, 2014). The 
Parish relied on Louisiana Revised Statutes section 33:109.1, which states: 
“Whenever a parish or municipal planning commission has adopted a master plan, 
state agencies and departments shall consider such adopted master plan before 
undertaking any activity or action which would affect the adopted elements of the 
master plan.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:109.1 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 42. Conservation’s Amended Exceptions to the Plaintiff’s First Supplemental 
Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 40, at 8–9. 
 43. The approval was granted with an extensive list of conditions, including 
restrictions on the water that may be used for fracking, disclosure of fracking 
chemicals, groundwater monitoring, and the use of closed-loop systems, but most 
of the conditions relating to fracking appear to be window dressing. The planned 
well is a test well and commercial production from the Tuscaloosa Marine Shale 
requires a horizontal interval. If the vertical well shows promise, then Helis must 
apply for an additional permit to drill and complete the well as a horizontal well 
before it hydraulically fractures the well. See Sara Pagones, State Approves 
Controversial Drilling Permit in St. Tammany, NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE (Dec. 
19, 2014, 4:53 PM), http://www.theneworleansadvocate.com/news/11137125-
171/state-approves-controversial-drilling-permit [perma.cc/Q9YH-8V5U]. 
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Judge William Morvant issued the court’s ruling and agreed with the LOC 
that state law preempts the St. Tammany zoning ordinance, and in an issue 
of first impression, that the obligation to “consider” a local zoning plan does 
not require adherence by the state to restrictions in the local zoning plan.44 
St. Tammany took a suspensive appeal to the Louisiana First Circuit Court 
of Appeal, allowing the Parish to enforce its zoning ordinance pending 
appeal.45 As of November 5, 2015, the appellate court has not ruled on the 
appeal, and St. Tammany has placed a “cease and desist” sign at the drilling 
site.46 
The Town of Abita Springs filed a related lawsuit on December 1, 2014 
in the 22nd Judicial District in Covington, Louisiana.47 The court dismissed 
that lawsuit on April 15, 2015, effectively holding that Abita Springs had no 
right to enforce St. Tammany Parish’s zoning ordinances.48 Abita Springs, 
however, filed a separate lawsuit in the 19th Judicial District, challenging 
the process by which the LOC issued the drilling permit to Helis.49 
For local residents, these challenges against fracking in St. Tammany 
are as much about local autonomy as fear of environmental calamity. 
Reduced to its legal essence, however, the St. Tammany suit simply is a 
question of the scope and the breadth of the Louisiana oil and gas 
preemption statute. The St. Tammany ordinance goes too far under state law 
by prohibiting the drilling of a well in a particular location, but the Louisiana 
Supreme Court has not resolved the extent to which local government in 
Louisiana can regulate oil and gas operations. For example, it is not entirely 
                                                                                                             
 44. Judgment at 2, St. Tammany Parish v. Welsh, No. 631370 (La. Dist. Ct. 
May 13, 2015). Specifically, the court held that the state complied with Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 33:109.1, which sets forth the obligation to “consider” 
adopted master plans. See supra note 41. 
 45. Order, St. Tammany Parish v. Welsh, No. 631370 (La. Dist. Ct. June 15, 
2015). 
 46. The First Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral argument on November 5, 
2015. See Robert Rhoden, St. Tammany Fracking Fight Heard by Appeals Court in 
Baton Rouge, NOLA.COM (Nov. 5, 2015, 3:26 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index 
.ssf/2015/11/st_tammany_fracking_fight_hear.html [perma.cc/BUU4-D5NX]; see 
also Robert Rhoden, Fracking Opponents Can’t Block St. Tammany Drilling 
Operation, Judge Rules, NOLA.COM (Apr. 20, 2015, 11:41 AM), http://www.nola 
.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/04/fracking_suit_hearing.html [perma.cc/4WMJ-J589]. 
 47. See Robert Rhoden, Town of Abita Springs Files Its Own Lawsuit in Effort 
to Block Proposed St. Tammany Fracking, NOLA.COM (Dec. 2, 2014, 3:27 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/12/town_of_abita_springs_files_it.ht 
ml [perma.cc/4F7E-X4SB].  
 48. Judgment at 1–2, Town of Abita Springs v. Welsh, No. 2014-15348 (La. 
Dist. Ct. May 13, 2015). 
 49. See infra Part VI.B for a discussion of this separate lawsuit. 
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clear whether reasonable surface restrictions on oil and gas wells, reasonable 
setbacks from buildings and other structures, or even a complete ban on 
fracking adopted by a local government might be valid. In part, this Article 
addresses the extent of this local authority. 
II. PREEMPTION STATUTES AND DECISIONS IN MOST STATES PRESERVE 
AT LEAST SOME LAND USE AUTHORITY  
In response to perceived risks of local intrusion on state interests in oil 
and gas production, the conservative Texas and Oklahoma legislatures 
recently enacted new preemption statutes. Although these statutes certainly 
diminish local land use autonomy, they also continue to allow some local 
authority over siting decisions. In several other producing states, local court 
decisions have overturned local bans on drilling and fracking, while at the 
same time recognizing that local governments still have an interest in local 
land use. 
A. The New Texas Preemption Statute 
Local anxiety over oil and gas development is not limited to Louisiana. 
Even the oil and gas friendly state of Texas has experienced local conflicts 
recently, boiling over on November 4, 2014,50 when voters in the City of 
Denton, Texas, approved the first local Texas ordinance that bans and 
criminalizes hydraulic fracturing.51 One day later, two lawsuits were filed. 
The first suit was filed by Jerry Patterson, Commissioner of the Texas 
General Land Office, alleging that the ban may not be enforced against lands 
and minerals that the State of Texas owns and that state law preempts the 
ban.52 In the second suit, the Texas Oil and Gas Association alleged that 
state law preempts the local ordinance, because state law both occupies the 
entire field of oil and gas regulation and also conflicts with the exclusive 
                                                                                                             
 50. See Jim Malewitz, Dissecting Denton: How a Texas City Banned Fracking, 
TEXAS TRIB. (Dec. 15, 2014), available at http://www.texastribune.org/2014/12/15 
/dissecting-denton-how-texas-city-baned-fracking/ [perma.cc/UZJ2-336Q]. 
 51. Denton, Tex., Ordinance Providing that Hydraulic Fracturing Operations 
Are Prohibited in the City (Nov. 4, 2014) (amending DENTON, TEX., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES ch. 16, art. VII (2014)). The ordinance is quite simple: “It shall be 
unlawful for any person to engage in hydraulic fracturing within the corporate limits 
of the City.” Id. Violation of the ordinance is punishable as a misdemeanor. Id. 
 52. Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Application for Permanent Injunction at 4–
5, Patterson v. City of Denton, No. D-1-GN-14-004628 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Nov. 5, 
2014). 
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authority of the Texas Railroad Commission (“TRRC”)53 and the Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) to regulate hydraulic 
fracturing.54  
Largely in response to the Denton fracking ban and the aspirations of 
other local governments to adopt stricter rules,55 the Texas legislature passed 
H.B. 40, which preempts local governments from regulating most aspects 
of oil and gas operations.56 On May 19, 2015, Texas Governor Greg Abbott 
signed H.B. 40 into law, effectively ending the Denton dispute.57 
H.B. 40 is exceptionally broad, prohibiting local governments from 
enacting or enforcing an ordinance or other measure that “bans, limits, or 
otherwise regulates an oil and gas operation . . . .”58 The exception involves 
an ordinance or measure that (1) regulates only surface activities, including 
“reasonable setback requirements”; (2) “is commercially reasonable”; (3) 
“does not effectively prohibit an oil and gas operation conducted by a 
reasonably prudent operator”; and (4) “is not otherwise preempted by state 
or federal law.”59 
A condition in a local ordinance is “‘commercially reasonable’” if the 
ordinance “would allow a reasonably prudent operator to fully, effectively, 
and economically exploit, develop, produce, process, and transport oil and 
gas, as determined based on the objective standard of a reasonably prudent 
operator . . . .”60 An ordinance might allow drilling and still be invalid under 
this commercially reasonable test if compliance costs make operations 
uneconomical or restrictions impede the production of all recoverable 
hydrocarbons.61 As such, the second requirement of commercial 
                                                                                                             
 53. The TRRC regulates oil and gas but no longer regulates railroads. Oil & Gas 
Division, R.R. COMM’N TEX. (Jul. 20, 2015, 12:17 PM), http://www.rrc.state.tx.us 
/about-us/organization-activities/divisions-of-the-rrc/oil-gas-division/ [perma.cc/D36 
3-JTP7]. 
 54. Original Petition at 8–10, Tex. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Denton, No. 
14-08933-431 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Nov. 5, 2014). 
 55. See Mike Lee, After Denton Frack Ban, the Wrangling Over Drilling Rules 
Goes On, ENERGYWIRE (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/12 
/08/stories/1060010064. 
 56. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523 (West Supp. 2015); see also Marissa 
Barnett, Abbott Signs Law to Restrict Local Fracking Regulations, DALL. MORNING 
NEWS (May 18, 2015, 11:16 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/state-
politics/20150518-abbott-signs-law-to-restrict-local-fracking-regulations.ece 
[perma.cc/55AY-P4RE]. 
 57. Barnett, supra note 56. 
 58. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523(b). 
 59. Id. § 81.0523(b), (c). 
 60. Id. § 81.0523(a)(1). 
 61. See id. § 81.0523(a)(2). 
2016] FRACKING IN LOUISIANA 821 
 
 
 
reasonableness appears to encompass the third requirement for a valid 
ordinance—that the ordinance “does not effectively prohibit an oil and gas 
operation.” 
Both the second and third requirements employ the “reasonably prudent 
operator” standard. Courts often apply this standard to determine whether 
implied covenants imposed on the lessee under an oil and gas lease are 
commercially reasonable and do not prohibit oil and gas operations.62 An oil 
and gas lease is a relational contract, meaning a contract where the parties 
have difficulty “reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-
defined obligations.”63 In the typical oil and gas lease, the lessee has few, if 
any, express contractual obligations other than to pay royalties on 
production. Professors Goetz and Scott posit that parties to a relational 
contract should define standards of performance in general terms.64 Based 
on the proposals of prominent commentators, courts might have required 
lessees to act with “best efforts” or as fiduciaries of their lessors.65 However, 
courts have routinely rejected such a high standard.66 Courts instead 
generally interpret the lessee’s obligations using a reasonably prudent 
operator standard.67 
                                                                                                             
 62. Although these implied covenants expand and evolve over time, they 
might be said to include requirements to drill an initial well, to reasonably develop 
the lease after production, to protect against drainage, to produce and market 
product, to operate with reasonable care, and to use modern methods of 
production. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 567 n.1 (Tex. 
1981) (citing R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 8.1 (1971)). 
 63. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principals of Relational Contracts, 
67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981). 
 64. Id. at 1092. 
 65. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL 
AND GAS LAW § 802.1 (2014) [hereinafter WILLIAMS & MEYERS] (citing C. 
Meyers & S. Crafton, The Covenant of Further Exploration – Thirty Years Later, 
32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1-1, 1-24 (1986)). An absolute duty to comply with 
implied covenants may apply in limited circumstances, usually when the lessee 
has caused the drainage of the property under lease. Alternatively, a few courts 
have applied a weak good faith standard for implied covenants. The Williams and 
Meyers treatise concludes that the prudent operator standard is the appropriate 
standard for implied covenants among these various alternative performance 
standards. Id. § 806. 
 66. See, e.g., Rutherford v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 855 F.2d 1141, 1145–46 (5th 
Cir. 1988); Amoco Production Co. v. Heimann, 904 F.2d 1405, 1412 (10th Cir. 
1990).  
 67. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 65, § 806 n.20 (listing cases); E. 
KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 61.3 (1978). 
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Substantively, the prudent operator standard might be compared to the 
objective “reasonable man” standard under tort law. The Williams and 
Meyers oil and gas treatise explains the standard: 
Since the standard of conduct is objective, a defendant cannot 
justify his act or omission on personal grounds or by reference to 
his peculiar circumstances. It is no excuse that defendant . . . is short 
of cash, over-committed on drilling programs, has no need for more 
production, or prefers to spend his money on other things. In short, 
the question is not what was meet and proper for this defendant to 
do, given his peculiar circumstances, but what a hypothetical 
operator acting reasonably would have done, given circumstances 
generally obtained in the locality.68 
Thus, the prudent operator standard is a single, objective standard that 
takes into account external conditions but ignores unique internal facts 
particular to the lessee.69 The authors of H.B. 40 apparently incorporated the 
prudent operator standard to deter operators’ claims against local 
governments that they could not comply with local regulations because of 
their own atypical technical, financial, or other limitations.70 Thus, a local 
ordinance is not preempted if the hypothetical reasonable operator can still 
effectively and economically produce its oil and gas. 
But no matter how commercially reasonable a restriction on fracking or 
other underground operational activity might be, such restrictions are 
preempted. The list of required elements of a valid ordinance contains the 
conjunctive “and,” meaning that a valid local ordinance must be 
commercially reasonable and must also regulate only surface activity. Thus, 
the new Texas statute recognizes in absolute terms that the process of 
drilling and completing a well is entirely within the jurisdiction of the state.  
The statute does, however, allow for some local control, including the 
location of wells.71 The statute recognizes that local regulations governing 
“fire and emergency response, traffic, lights, or noise” are the types of 
surface activities that local governments normally may regulate within the 
                                                                                                             
 68. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 65, § 806.  
 69. See David E. Pierce, Exploring the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the 
Implied Covenant to Market, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 10.04[3] (2002). 
 70. H.B. 40 also includes a potential savings clause for certain existing 
ordinances: “An ordinance or other measure is considered prima facie to be 
commercially reasonable if the ordinance or other measure has been in effect for 
at least five years and has allowed the oil and gas operations at issue to continue 
during that period.” TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523(d) (West Supp. 2015). 
 71. Id. § 81.0523(c)(1). 
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realm of local control.72 Furthermore, courts might permit regulations 
governing location even in the context of drilling operations, including 
setbacks and even traditional zoning ordinances that restrict particular uses to 
certain zones, when the facts and circumstances allow a reasonably prudent 
operator to access the formation through horizontal drilling and other 
techniques and to conduct operations “fully, effectively, and economically.”73 
Texas has completely preempted the “how” of underground drilling, 
completion, and other operations, but it still allows Texas municipalities some 
say over where wells can be drilled and the conduct of surface activities. 
B. The New Oklahoma Preemption Statute 
Just over a week after Governor Abbott signed the Texas preemption 
bill, Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin signed a similar bill.74 The Oklahoma 
bill, however, arguably is even more ambiguous than the Texas bill. Before 
Governor Fallin signed the new bill into law, Oklahoma expressly allowed 
“cities and towns governmental corporate powers to prevent oil or gas 
drilling therein” and “to provide its own rules and regulations with reference 
to well spacing units or drilling or production . . . .”75 The new statute allows 
local governments to adopt reasonable ordinances concerning “road use, 
traffic, noise and odors” and “reasonable setbacks and fencing requirements 
for oil and gas well site locations as are reasonably necessary to protect the 
health, safety and welfare of its citizens. . . .”76 Such setbacks may not 
                                                                                                             
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. § 81.0523(a)(1). Future litigation will determine the objective 
reasonableness of setbacks, zoning regulations, and other attempts to protect the 
character of neighborhoods under specific ordinances. By incorporating an 
objective standard, the statute avoids relitigating particular ordinances as applied to 
different operators. The statute, however, only establishes objective reasonableness 
or unreasonableness as of a particular point in time. Regulations that unreasonably 
impede the operations of a reasonably prudent operator today using existing 
technology and cost constraints might be reasonable in the future as technology 
develops and the costs fall. In 2008, Maersk Oil Qatar completed a well with a 
horizontal length of 35,770 feet (6.77 miles). Dennis Denney, Continuous 
Improvement Led to the Longest Horizontal Well, J. PETROLEUM TECH., Nov. 
2009, at 55. If wells with horizontal laterals of such length or longer become 
commonplace, more onerous zoning and setback limitations might eventually be 
acceptable. 
 74. 2015 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 341 (codified at 52 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 137.1 
(Supp. 2015)). 
 75. 52 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 137 (2011) (repealed by 2015 Okla. Sess. Laws 
c. 341, § 2). 
 76. 52 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 137.1 (Supp. 2015). 
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“effectively prohibit or ban any oil and gas operations,” including 
fracking.77 The statute then goes on to state that “[a]ll other regulations of 
oil and gas operations shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Corporation Commission.”78  
The Oklahoma statute, which expressly allows “reasonable setbacks,” 
does not expressly allow the zoning of oil and gas into industrial or other 
districts. All local “regulations,” other than those expressly allowed by the 
statute, are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state, but the statute 
does not define the words “regulation” or “operation.”79 Whether the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the state is limited to technical operations involving 
the drilling and completing of wells or whether the term “regulation” also 
encompasses the location of wells through traditional zoning is yet to be 
determined.80 Certainly, a municipality in Oklahoma could not prohibit 
drilling because the legislature repealed the former statute that expressly 
authorized drilling bans.81 Similar to the new Texas law, future litigation 
will likely determine whether a municipality might also zone oil and gas into 
reasonable industrial districts and what might constitute a reasonable 
setback.82 In any event, the statute clearly leaves room for some local 
authority as to the location of wells. 
C. Court Decisions in Other States Recognize the Process/Land Use 
Distinction 
Recent court decisions in other states recognize the distinction between 
the technical operational aspects of drilling and traditional land use.83 These 
decisions usually conclude that absolute prohibitions on drilling and 
production or completion technologies—including hydraulic fracturing—
                                                                                                             
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 81. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra note 73 and accompanying text; Joe Wertz, City Officials 
Reconsider Drilling Ordinances as Anti-Frack Ban Legislation Moves Forward, NPR 
(Apr. 30, 2015, 12:48 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2015/04/30/city-
officials-reconsider-oil-and-gas-ordinances-as-anti-frack-ban-legislation-moves-for 
ward/ [perma.cc/F47A-CJSJ] (question of what might be considered reasonable 
drawing criticism).  
 83. For a more comprehensive discussion and analysis of the cases discussed 
in this Part, see generally Alex Ritchie, Creatures of Circumstance: Conflicts 
Over Local Government Regulation of Oil and Gas, 60 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 
11-1, 11-6 (2015). 
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frustrate state interests.84 The exception to this latter generalization is New 
York, where the Court of Appeals held that the state legislature did not 
intend for a statute that supersedes local government “regulation” of oil and 
gas operations to preempt zoning and land use.85 The court explained that 
zoning and land use are powers within the province of local governments 
and that courts should protect these powers in deference to home rule 
authority.86 To this court, a complete ban on oil and gas operations is simply 
a zoning and land use decision that does not conflict with either the language 
of the preemption statute or the policies of preventing waste and protecting 
correlative rights in the state oil and gas statutes.87  
In Pennsylvania, a plurality of four justices of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court completely invalidated two out of three express statutory 
preemption provisions in the oil and gas conservation statute that the state 
legislature had adopted.88 The plurality held that these preemption statutes 
                                                                                                             
 84. In addition to the cases discussed in this Part II.C, see Northeast Natural 
Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376 (W. Va. 
Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (holding that the city lacks authority to enact a fracking 
ban). For a discussion of this case, see Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Local Regulation 
of Hydraulic Fracturing, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 593 (2014). 
 85. In In re Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014), the 
New York Court of Appeals—New York’s highest court—consolidated the cases 
of Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2013), and Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 964 
N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). The conclusion in In re Wallach was 
preordained by the court’s decision in In re Frew Run Gravel Products, Inc. v. 
Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1987), where the court held that an 
express preemption provision only applied to local laws that purported to regulate 
the operational aspects of mining. Id. at 922. In In re Wallach, the court stated 
that “this incidental control resulting from the municipality’s exercise of its right 
to regulate land use through zoning is not the type of regulatory enactment relating 
to the [oil, gas and solution mining industries] which the Legislature could have 
envisioned as being within the prohibition of the statute.” 16 N.E.3d at 1197 
(quoting Frew Run, 518 N.E. 2d at 920). 
 86. 16 N.E.3d at 1197. 
 87. Id. at 1199. 
 88. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 1000 (Pa. 2013). On 
February 14, 2012, the Pennsylvania Legislature adopted “Act 13,” a 
comprehensive statutory framework to regulate oil and gas operations. See 58 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2301 to 3504 (West 2014). Act 13 contained three express 
preemption provisions. The first, section 3302, supersedes local ordinances 
“purporting to regulate oil and gas operations,” except those adopted pursuant to 
the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code and the Flood Plain Management 
Act. Id. § 3302. Section 3302 contains language almost identical to former section 
601.602 of the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act, which Act 13 repealed, see 58 PA. 
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violated a fairly unique state constitutional amendment that grants citizens 
a right to clean air and water and imposes a public trust on the natural 
resources of the state.89 According to the plurality, the offending preemption 
provisions impeded the ability of local governments to protect their citizens 
and the environment through the exercise of their land use authority.90 
Pennsylvania, however, continues to recognize the distinction between 
process and land use. One express preemption provision survived the 
decision and continues to supersede the ability of Pennsylvania local 
governments to regulate the technical operational aspects of drilling and 
production in a manner that conflicts with state law.91 
In Colorado and New Mexico, industry and state regulatory plaintiffs 
challenging local bans have been successful in recent court actions.92 But 
                                                                                                             
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 601.602 (repealed 2012), and which previously was 
interpreted as allowing local governments to zone oil and gas operations, but not 
to regulate the operational aspects of drilling. See Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. 
Borough Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 865 (Pa. 2009). The second express 
preemption provision, section 3303, expands on section 3302 by declaring that 
state environmental acts “occupy the entire field of regulation” as it relates to the 
environmental regulation of oil and gas. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3303. The 
third, section 3304, requires that oil and gas development be allowed as a 
permitted use in any municipal zoning district, and that restrictions on oil and gas 
development be no greater than those placed on other industrial uses. Id. § 
3304(b)(3), (5). The plurality in Robinson Township struck down sections 3303 
and 3304, but allowed section 3302 to stand. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1000. 
 89. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 913; see also PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (“The 
people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, 
scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public 
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations 
yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and 
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”). 
 90. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 978 (“Act 13 thus commands municipalities 
to ignore their obligations under [the Environmental Rights Amendment] and 
further directs municipalities to take affirmative actions to undo existing 
protections of the environment in their localities.”). In contrast, the Louisiana 
Constitution contains a mandate for the state to protect and conserve the “natural 
resources of the state, including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, 
and esthetic quality of the environment.” LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. Unlike the 
language in the Pennsylvania Constitution, however, the language of this mandate 
does not purport to create an individual constitutional right in the environment. 
Id.; see also infra Part VI.B. 
 91. See supra note 88. 
 92. See Order Granting Motions for Summary Judgment, Colo. Oil & Gas 
Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 2013CV63, 2014 WL 3690665 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 
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these decisions do not upset the distinction between process and land use 
and the ability of local governments to adopt reasonable zoning restrictions. 
Neither the Colorado nor the New Mexico conservation statutes contain 
express preemption provisions, but, in these recent Colorado and New 
Mexico cases, the courts found preemption based on implied conflicts with 
state law. 
On July 24, 2014, the Boulder County District Court, on summary 
judgment, struck down a local voter-initiated outright fracking ban that the 
City of Longmont, Colorado, had adopted.93 The next month, the same court 
struck down a broader ban on oil and gas extraction and storage that the City 
of Lafayette, Colorado, had adopted.94 Also in August 2014, the Larimer 
County District Court struck down a fracking ban—similar to the Longmont 
ban—that the City of Fort Collins, Colorado, had adopted.95 Although these 
courts held that the drilling and fracking bans went too far, none of these 
cases question the decision in Board of County Commissioners, La Plata 
County v. Bowen/Edwards Associates, Inc.,96 where the Colorado Supreme 
Court held that local governments have distinct interests in land use control 
that differ from the state interest in regulating the technical operational 
aspects of production.97 
On January 19, 2015, the United States District Court for the District of 
New Mexico struck down a ban from Mora County that was similar to the 
Lafayette, Colorado ordinance.98 In his decision, however, Judge James O. 
Browning made clear that the New Mexico Oil and Gas Act does not address 
issues with which local governments are traditionally concerned.99 That 
holding leaves room for the concurrent jurisdiction of state and local 
governments. 
                                                                                                             
July 24, 2014); see also Memorandum Opinion and Order, SWEPI, LP v. Mora 
Cnty., 81 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (D.N.M. 2015). 
 93. Order Granting Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 92. 
 94. See Boulder District Judge Tosses Lafayette’s Fracking Ban, DENVER POST 
BUS. (Aug. 27, 2014, 6:13 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_26419597 
/boulder-district-judge-tosses-lafayettes-fracking-ban [perma.cc/A836-FYE2]. 
 95. Order Granting Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary Judgment on First Claim 
for Relief and Denying Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Colo. 
Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Fort Collins, No. 13CV31385 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 7, 
2014). 
 96. 830 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1992) (en banc). 
 97. Id. at 1058. 
 98. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, SWEPI, LP v. Mora Cnty., supra 
note 92.  
 99. 830 P.2d at 1195. 
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Even in the rare case where a preemption provision purports to 
expressly cover zoning and land use, courts may be reluctant to extend the 
provision so far. In the recent case of State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy 
Corp.,100 the Supreme Court of Ohio had the occasion to interpret Ohio 
Revised Code section 1509.02, which grants the Ohio Department of Natural 
Resources the “sole and exclusive authority to regulate the permitting, 
location, and spacing of oil and gas wells and production operations” within 
Ohio.101 The statute only preserves to municipalities special powers relating 
to certain public infrastructure and heavy vehicles operating on their 
highways.102 The City of Munroe Falls sought an injunction to require Beck 
Energy to comply with its ordinances before Beck began drilling 
operations.103 The ordinances imposed the City’s own permitting system 
replete with conditions, including the requirement for a conditional zoning 
certificate that could contain whatever conditions the City might choose to 
impose.104 To the 4-3 majority, these conditions impermissibly violated 
Ohio’s express preemption provision.105 
Despite the word “location” in the statute, some members of the court 
sought to restrict the reach of the holding. Concurring in the judgment only, 
Justice O’Donnell wrote separately to emphasize that the court’s holding 
was limited to the Munroe Falls ordinances at issue.106 For Justice 
O’Donnell, the case did not present the question of whether the express 
preemption provision conflicts with traditional land use ordinances that do 
not impose a separate permitting regime.107 He argued the word “location” 
has a meaning in oil and gas law that relates only to the efficient production 
of oil and gas, a meaning that does not implicate zoning.108 
In dissent, Justice Lazinger, joined by Justices Pfeifer and O’Neill, did 
not dispute the breadth of the preemption provision but instead relied on the 
Ohio presumption in favor of home rule.109 Justice Lazinger argued that 
more than a preemption statement is necessary to preempt in Ohio. Rather, 
the general law must actually regulate in the same area as the local law,110 
                                                                                                             
 100. 37 N.E.3d 128 (Ohio 2015). 
 101. 15 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013) (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. 
 103. State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., No. 2013-0465, 2015 WL 
687475, at *5 (Ohio Feb. 17, 2015). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at *8. 
 106. Id. at *38.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at *43–44. 
 109. Id. at *53–56. 
 110. Id. at *56. 
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which presumably means in this case that the state must mandate and specify 
local zoning regulations for oil and gas. 
The legislature or the courts in each of the states discussed in this Part, 
including those states that deem outright bans a violation of important state 
interests, in varying degrees recognize a role for local governments to 
exercise authority over the siting of wells under their land use powers. As 
discussed in Part III, Louisiana is different, vesting the state with virtually 
complete authority to determine where wells may be sited. 
III. LOUISIANA AT THE EXTREME OF STATE CONTROL 
Securing the character of neighborhoods under the zoning power has 
long been recognized as an essential power of local governments, but under 
Louisiana law, that power is not unlimited. In the oil and gas context, the 
zoning power is constrained by an express preemption statute, Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 30:28(F).111 This Part analyzes the statute in light 
of existing precedent and in the context of the zoning power, concluding 
that—despite arguments to the contrary—the language of the statute leaves 
little room for local authority over either the location of wells or the process 
of drilling or completing (including fracking) a well. The extent of this 
balance in favor of the state may appear extreme,112 particularly in light of 
other states’ laws that allow some degree of local autonomy, but to change 
this balance in deference to the policy underlying zoning would require 
legislative action. 
A. Reserving Land as Justification for Local Control 
All of these state–local conflicts with oil and gas production center on 
the ability of local governments to protect and provide for the welfare of 
their citizens. The United States Supreme Court has stated that “reserving 
land for single-family residences preserves the character of neighborhoods, 
securing ‘zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of 
quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.’”113 The 
                                                                                                             
 111. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:28(F) (Supp. 2015). 
 112. In oral argument on appeal of the St. Tammany case, Judge Guidry 
apparently asked whether, despite zoning, a well could be drilled on the 50-yard 
line inside Louisiana State University’s Tiger Stadium, and apparently counsel 
for the state answered that it could. Robert Rhoden, St. Tammany Fracking Fight 
Heard by Appeals Court in Baton Rouge, NOLA.COM (Nov. 5, 2015, 3:26 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/11/st_tammany_fracking_fight_hear.
html [perma.cc/B4CF-SUEP]. 
 113. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 732–33 (1995) 
(quoting Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974)). 
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need for local governments to provide these zoning sanctuaries has justified 
judicial deference to local government zoning since the 1926 decision in 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,114 where the Court referred to 
undesirable uses as “merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the 
parlor instead of the barnyard.”115 
Parishes and municipalities in Louisiana, as in other states, regulate land 
use under its police power.116 Zoning is related to the police power, in that 
the right to prescribe and proscribe land uses under the zoning power derives 
from the police power.117 One treatise has described the police power as “the 
exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety, 
health, morals and the general welfare of society within constitutional 
limits.”118 
Before the adoption of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, local zoning 
ordinances were authorized under the 1921 Louisiana Constitution. This 
prior version of the state constitution provided general authority to 
municipalities to “zone their territory; to create residential, commercial and 
industrial districts, and to prohibit the establishment of places of business in 
residential districts.”119 This provision did not restrict legislative power to 
delegate zoning authority to other political subdivisions, such as parishes,120 
nor the parish and municipal power to create types of districts, other than 
the enumerated residential, commercial, and industrial districts.121  
The 1974 Louisiana Constitution explicitly extends an independent 
grant of authority to all local government subdivisions to adopt zoning and 
land use regulations, subject only to “uniform procedures established by 
law.”122 Although this authority derives directly from the 1974 Constitution, 
                                                                                                             
 114. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 115. Id. at 388. 
 116. Palermo Land Co., Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of Calcasieu Parish, 561 So. 
2d 482, 488 (La. 1990). 
 117. Four States Realty Co., Inc. v. Baton Rouge, 309 So. 2d 659, 672 (La. 
1975); see also Coffee City v. Thompson, 535 S.W.2d 758, 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1976); Forks Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v. George Calantoni & Sons, Inc., 297 A.2d 
164, 166 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972); Maldini v. Ambro, 330 N.E.2d 403, 405 (N.Y. 
1975); Hausmann & Johnson, Inc. v. Berea Bd. of Bldg. Code Appeals, 320 
N.E.2d 685, 688 (Ohio 1974). 
 118. 6 PATRICK J. ROHAN & ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, ZONING AND LAND USE 
CONTROLS § 35.05 (LexisNexis Mathew Bender 2015). 
 119. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 29 (1921). 
 120. Plebst v. Barnwell Drilling Co., 148 So. 2d 584, 591 (La. 1963). 
 121. Folsom Rd. Civic Ass’n v. St. Tammany Parish, 407 So. 2d 1219, 1223 
(La. 1981). 
 122. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 17 (1974). Zoning ordinances and other laws 
adopted before 1974 must be constitutional under the 1974 Constitution and must 
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the Louisiana Supreme Court has not determined whether the state can deny 
the zoning power to local governments except when necessary to protect a 
vital state interest. In fact, the court expressly declined to answer the 
question in St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc. v. Riverboat Gaming 
Commission,123 instead concluding that the state had not denied the zoning 
power.124 
Although broad, this express constitutional grant of zoning power is 
clearly not unlimited. First, the constitution makes clear that local zoning 
power may not abridge the police power of the state,125 meaning that the 
zoning power may not impinge a state power that is necessary to protect a 
vital interest of the state as a whole.126 The courts, however, have not 
answered whether the state’s interest in oil and gas production is a vital 
interest or whether the state’s preemption of that interest is necessary. 
Second, local zoning authority is subject to state-mandated procedures.127 
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the “subject to” language 
requires the state to issue procedures for parish zoning before a parish may 
zone,128 meaning that state-issued procedures are essential. The fact that the 
court requires the state to authorize zoning implies that the state could deny 
zoning power by an express general law preemption provision, even to 
protect an interest that is not necessarily vital. Third, despite the 
constitutional grant of zoning authority, the state must not exercise that 
authority in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious manner.129 
To fulfill the constitutional promise of zoning, the state legislature has 
enacted zoning enabling acts. For the purposes of “promoting the health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare of the community,” municipalities and 
most parishes may regulate and restrict the location and use of buildings, 
                                                                                                             
also have been constitutional when enacted under the 1921 Constitution. See LA. 
CONST. art. XIV, § 18(A); Azalea Lakes P’ship v. Parish of St. Tammany, 859 
So. 2d 57, 60 (La. Ct. App. 2003). 
 123. 648 So. 2d 1310, 1318 (La. 1995). 
 124. Id. at 1318, n.7 (“Because we decide here that [the state law] does not deny 
zoning and land use powers to local governments, we do not need to reach the issue 
urged by amicus curiae of whether the state legislature is empowered to limit or 
deny the express constitutional grant of this authority to all local governments by 
any act less imperative than an exercise of the state’s police power necessary to 
protect the vital interest of the state as a whole.”). 
 125. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 9. 
 126. See infra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Am. Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. St. Martin Parish Police Jury, 
609 So. 2d 201, 204–05 (La. 1992).  
 128. See id.  
 129. See City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Dirs. of La. State Museum, 739 So. 2d 
748, 759 (La. 1999). 
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structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.130 This 
regulatory authority is checked by the judicial review of zoning ordinances 
and decisions made under those ordinances for abuse of discretion, 
unreasonable exercise of the police powers, excessive use of the zoning 
power, or the denial of the right of due process.131  
For zoning purposes, the municipality or parish may divide itself into 
districts, provided that the regulations of permitted actions are uniform 
throughout each particular district.132 Zoning regulations must be made in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan and must reasonably consider the 
character of each district and the suitability for particular uses, encouraging 
the appropriate use of land throughout the municipality.133 The plan 
requirement is essential because a single prohibitive industry regulation 
without a comprehensive plan is invalid.134 The plan does not need to be 
terribly comprehensive in practice, however. The creation of a single district 
apparently qualifies as a comprehensive plan.135 
Courts presume all zoning ordinances are valid, and whoever attacks the 
validity of an ordinance bears the burden of proof.136 Further, since the 1923 
case of State ex rel Civello v. City of New Orleans,137 Louisiana courts have 
not questioned the motivations of the governmental unit in promoting 
health, safety, and welfare, where concern for the public could have been 
the motivating factor, regardless of whether the concern actually was.138 
                                                                                                             
 130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4721 (2009) (municipalities); Id. § 33:4780.40 
(parishes). 
 131. Id. § 33:4721 (municipalities); Id. § 33:4780.40 (parishes); see also 
Guenther v. Zoning Appeals Bd., 542 So. 2d 612, 614 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
 132. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4722 (2009) (municipalities); Id. § 33:4780.41 
(parishes). 
 133. Id. § 33:4723 (municipalities); Id. § 33:4780.42 (parishes). 
 134. See Trail Mining, Inc. v. Vill. of Sun, 619 So. 2d 118, 119 (La. Ct. App. 
1993) (ordinance that required 1200 foot setbacks between a gravel pit and a 
residence held invalid without comprehensive plan). The Village argued that the 
ordinance was not a zoning ordinance, but a health and safety ordinance. Id. 
Although the Village abandoned this argument, the court nevertheless “confirms” 
that the ordinance is a zoning ordinance. Id. 
 135. See Jameson v. St. Tammany Parish Police Jury, 225 So. 2d 720, 723–24 
(La. Ct. App. 1969); LaRussa Enters., Inc. v. Gordon, No. 2012-0896 (La. Ct. 
App. 2013) (unpublished opinion). 
 136. Four States Realty Co., Inc. v. Baton Rouge, 309 So. 2d 659, 672 (La. 1975). 
 137. 97 So. 440 (La. 1923). 
 138. See id. at 443–44 (“It is not necessary, for the validity of the ordinances 
in question, that we should deem the ordinances justified by considerations of 
public health, safety, comfort, or the general welfare. It is sufficient that the 
municipal council could reasonably have had such considerations in mind. If such 
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This standard is roughly equivalent to the “fairly debatable” standard that 
the United States Supreme Court has employed since Euclid to judge the 
validity of local ordinances on due process grounds.139 
In addition to this deferential standard, under express language in the 
Louisiana statutes, when zoning regulations impose a “higher” standard than 
“any other statute or local ordinance or regulation,” the higher standard 
controls.140 In the context of the statute, the higher standard appears to 
connote the more restrictive standard, meaning that in the case of a conflict 
between state law and local law, the more restrictive standard should 
normally control.141 Accordingly, unless their power is preempted, 
municipalities have the ability to supplement state regulation with more 
restrictive standards in their jurisdictions. Although this rule for 
municipalities in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 33:4729 is unqualified, 
the corresponding rule for parishes in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
33:4780.49 diverges. The penultimate sentence of Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 33:4780.49 states:  
However, no local governing authority shall restrict, conflict with, 
interfere with, or supersede the powers of the state through its 
agencies to regulate, permit, or enforce environmental laws and 
regulations nor shall they restrict, conflict with, interfere with, or 
supersede activities operating in accordance with authorized state 
or federal permits, laws, or regulations.142  
                                                                                                             
considerations could have justified the ordinances, we must assume that they did 
justify them.”); see also Palermo Land Co., Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of Calcasieu 
Parish, 561 So. 2d 482, 491–92 (La. 1990); Palermo, 561 So. 2d at 491–92 
(quoting State ex rel. Civello with approval). 
 139. See Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
Professor Bruce Kramer coined the name of the “fairly debatable” test because 
“the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes” need only be 
“fairly debatable” to survive judicial scrutiny. See Bruce M. Kramer, Local Land 
Use Regulation of Extractive Industries: Evolving Judicial and Regulatory 
Approaches, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 41, 44, 63 (1996). 
 140. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4729 (2009) (municipalities); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 33:4780.49 (parishes). 
 141. The Louisiana statute relating to building codes that political subdivisions 
adopt is more clear. That statute provides that “[i]f the provisions of a building 
code adopted by a political subdivision are more stringent than [] state laws . . . 
the more restrictive standards shall govern within the area under the jurisdiction 
of the political subdivision.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4773.  
 142. Id. § 33:4780.49. 
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This “however” language plainly subordinates more restrictive local 
regulations to activities authorized under state-issued permits, including oil 
and gas drilling permits and forced pooling orders. As such, municipalities 
seemingly have greater authority to adopt more restrictive zoning regulations 
than do parishes.  
B. Louisiana Statutes Preempt Land Use Authority 
Despite the constitutional and statutory protections afforded to zoning, 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:28(F) strips municipalities of the 
power to secure zones and protect the character of neighborhoods in the oil 
and gas context. That statute provides: 
The issuance of the [drilling] permit by the commissioner of 
conservation shall be sufficient authorization to the holder of the 
permit to enter upon the property covered by the permit and to 
drill in search of minerals thereon. No other agency or political 
subdivision of the state shall have the authority, and they are 
hereby expressly forbidden, to prohibit or in any way interfere 
with the drilling of a well or test well in search of minerals by the 
holder of such a permit.143 
In 2005, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion 
to interpret this broad grant of power to the state in Energy Management 
Corp. v. City of Shreveport (“EMC 1”),144 a case that the LOC extensively 
relied upon in its briefs in the St. Tammany case.145 In EMC 1, the City of 
Shreveport passed a zoning ordinance that prohibited drilling within 1,000 
feet of a lake.146 The plaintiff, Energy Management Corp., acquired leases 
to drill in and around the lake and sued the City after the City made clear 
that it would not issue a variance.147 
For some inexplicable reason, the EMC 1 court stated that no express 
statutory provision mandated preemption,148 even though municipalities and 
parishes are “expressly forbidden” under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
30:28(F) from prohibiting or interfering with the drilling of an oil and gas 
                                                                                                             
 143. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:28(F) (Supp. 2015). 
 144. 397 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 145. LOC Response Memorandum, supra note 38, at 8–9. 
 146. 397 F.3d at 299. 
 147. Id. at 300. 
 148. Id. at 303 (“In this case there is no express provision mandating pre-
emption.”). 
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well. In apparent reliance on a field preemption analysis,149 however, the 
court remanded the case for entry of a declaratory judgment that the local 
ordinance “is preempted by state law and is invalid to the extent that it 
purports to prohibit the drilling of oil and gas wells in an area within the 
state of Louisiana . . . .”150 
On remand, the district court entered the judgment exactly as written by 
the Fifth Circuit EMC 1 court,151 but the plaintiff noted a significant problem 
with the court’s language.152 Although the EMC 1 court struck down 
municipal restrictions regarding where Energy Management Corp. could 
drill wells, the court failed to address other costly technical or operational 
conditions or regulations that local governments might impose that 
“interfere” with the drilling of a well. On appeal in Energy Management 
Corp. v. City of Shreveport (“EMC 2”),153 the Fifth Circuit broadened its 
holding to preempt the local law in its entirety, both as to the location of 
wells and as to other “‘activities,’” including “‘every phase’” of 
operations.154 
The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, has never addressed Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 30:28(F) in the context of a fracking ban or a 
reasonable traditional zoning ordinance that divides land uses into districts. 
The EMC 1 court quotes the Louisiana Supreme Court that “‘the authority 
and responsibility for conserving Louisiana’s oil and gas resources are 
virtually entirely vested in the [LOC].’”155 This statement in isolation, 
however, by no means vests authority in the LOC to control reasonable local 
land use decisions. 
                                                                                                             
 149. Field preemption occurs when state law occupies the entire field of 
regulation, such that there is no room for local regulation. Once a court finds field 
preemption, the key question becomes how broadly or narrowly the legislature 
intended to define the “field,” a question left for the judiciary. See Ritchie, supra 
note 83, at 11-70. 
 150. EMC 1, 397 F.3d at 306 (emphasis added). 
 151. See Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, CIV. A. 97-2408, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43715 (W.D. La. May 5, 2005), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
remanded by Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 467 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 
2006). 
 152. See 467 F.3d at 475–76. 
 153. 467 F.3d 471. 
 154. Id. at 478 (citing 397 F.3d at 303). 
 155. EMC 1, 397 F.3d at 303 (quoting Hunt Oil Co. v. Batchelor, 644 So. 2d 
191, 196–97 (La. 1994)). The authority to conserve oil and gas does not 
necessarily extend to land use. See supra Part II.C. Batchelor actually involved a 
question of the correlative rights of under-produced owners in a gas balancing 
situation, which clearly is within the statutory authority of the LOC. See LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 31:9 to :11 (2000). 
836 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
 
 
 
Citing a number of cases, the EMC 1 court also states that “[i]n every 
case which has been brought to our attention involving a challenge to the 
authority of the LOC, its far-reaching authority has been upheld.”156 The 
court, however, fails to mention City of Baton Rouge v. Hebert,157 where the 
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal determined that adding storage 
tanks to a drill site impermissibly extended to a non-conforming use under 
a local zoning ordinance.158 With little analysis, the Hebert court 
acknowledged that “aspects” of petroleum production were preempted, but 
the court did “not believe the state’s preemption in this field extends to 
abridging a municipality’s control over land use within its corporate 
boundary . . . .”159 This situation is just the type of distinction between 
process and land use that Professor Kenneth Murchison described as the 
appropriate dividing line for state and local regulation.160 
Further, the cases that the EMC 1 court cited are relevant, but they are 
at least somewhat distinguishable. In one cited case, Rollins Environmental 
Services of Louisiana, Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury,161 the police jury 
of Iberville Parish amended its local ordinance to prohibit the injection and 
storage of hazardous waste.162 This practice prevented the plaintiff from 
operating its industrial residue disposal well that the LOC had already 
permitted. The court reviewed not only state law but also federal laws such 
as the Clean Water Act163 and the Recourse Conservation and Recovery 
Act.164 The court held that, when considered together, federal and state laws 
preempted the entire field of hazardous waste regulation.165  
In Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Commission of Calcasieu Parish,166 
however, the Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished Rollins.167 The court 
explained that Rollins concerned hazardous wastes and Palermo concerned 
non-hazardous wastes.168 The Palermo court further explained that even 
with respect to hazardous wastes, the legislature had amended the statute to 
                                                                                                             
 156. EMC 1, 397 F.3d at 303. 
 157. 378 So. 2d 144 (La. Ct. App. 1979). 
 158. Id. at 146. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See infra note 249 and accompanying text. Admittedly, however, Hebert 
did not involve the drilling of a well. 
 161. 371 So. 2d 1127 (La. 1979). 
 162. Id. at 1129. 
 163. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1972). 
 164. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976). 
 165. Rollins, 371 So. 2d at 1134. 
 166. 561 So. 2d 482 (La. 1990). 
 167. Id. at 497 n.15. 
 168. Id. 
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allow the regulation by both parishes and municipalities of “the initial siting 
of facilities pursuant to general land use planning, zoning, or solid waste 
disposal ordinances.”169 Accordingly, Palermo at least raises the question as 
to whether the Louisiana Supreme Court’s preemption stance in Rollins has 
softened. 
Despite these subtle arguments, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
30:28(F) is nonetheless clear and extends broad power to the state 
government. As the language provides, a local government may not prohibit 
or interfere with the drilling of a well that the LOC has authorized.170 When 
the LOC issues a drilling permit, it authorizes drilling at a particular 
location. A local government that prohibits drilling in that location, whether 
through reasonable or unreasonable regulation, violates the express statutory 
mandate in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:28(F). Thus, the 
preemption statute prohibits not only zoning oil and gas into districts, as St. 
Tammany attempted to do, but it also prohibits local governments from 
imposing setbacks. Given the breadth of the express preemption language, 
the result in EMC 1 comports with the statutory language.171 
In contrast, the EMC 2 holding—that every phase of oil and gas 
operations is preempted—does not entirely accord with the preemption 
language. Consider a fracking ban, which certainly interferes with the 
process of extracting minerals, particularly from shale. An argument can be 
made that a fracking ban does not interfere with the drilling of a well if 
fracking is viewed as a separate well stimulation process. Such an argument, 
however, would likely fail in a Louisiana court.172 If the Louisiana 
Legislature saw fit to preempt the regulation of the location of wells, 
certainly the courts would preserve traditional state authority over the 
process by which wells are drilled and completed as they have in other 
states, including those without an express preemption statute.173 
IV. LOUISIANA’S HOME RULE AUTHORITY FAILS TO SUPPORT LOCAL 
REGULATION OF THE LOCATION OF WELLS 
Home rule traditions and the attendant philosophy of local autonomy 
provide a policy basis for a local voice in decisions regarding oil and gas 
                                                                                                             
 169. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1236(31)(a)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 170. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:28(F) (2007). 
 171. The EMC 1 court concluded that “the process of regulating when and 
where an oil and gas well may be drilled within the state is entirely vested in the 
LOC.” EMC 1, 397 F.3d 297, 304 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 172. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra Part II.C. 
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operations. In the New York case Matter of Wallach, home rule and the 
importance of land use powers served as the foundational justification for 
the court’s distinction between process and land use, which led to a 
determination that preemption of “regulation” did not preempt zoning out 
oil and gas operations.174 Similarly, based on the opinion of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court in City of New Orleans v. Board of Commissioners of the 
Orleans Levee District,175 pre-1974 home rule entities could argue that their 
home rule powers included the right to regulate oil and gas operations 
through their zoning and land use powers free of the preemption statute—
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:28(F). The Louisiana Supreme Court, 
however, has retreated over time from its decision in City of New Orleans.176 
In light of judicial decisions since City of New Orleans, the express 
prohibitions in Louisiana’s preemption statute would likely defeat any home 
rule entities’ legal claim of right to regulate the location of wells in 
Louisiana. 
A. The Road to Home Rule in Louisiana 
Before Louisiana adopted a new constitution in 1974, Louisiana courts 
routinely held that “[p]arishes and municipal corporations of [the] state are 
vested with no powers, and possess no authority, except such as are 
conferred upon, or delegated to, them by the Constitution and statutes.”177 
Political subdivisions were mere “creatures of the state, established by the 
legislature for the purpose of administering local affairs of government.”178 
The lack of significant local authority was partly a product of the 1921 
Constitution and partly the result of court marginalization of any authority 
that the Louisiana Legislature granted. The 1921 Constitution was a heavily 
detailed document that read more like a set of statutes.179 Due to its 
excessive detail, that constitution required frequent amendments to adapt to 
changing times, changing circumstances, and political whims. After being 
                                                                                                             
 174. See In re Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1194–95 (N.Y. 
2014). 
 175. 640 So. 2d 237, 251 (La. 1994). 
 176. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Dirs. of La. State Museum, 739 
So. 2d 748 (La. 1999).  
 177. State v. Jordan, 20 So. 2d 543, 545 (La. 1944).  
 178. Pyle v. City of Shreveport, 40 So. 2d 235, 238 (1949) (quoting Edwards 
v. Town of Ponchatoula, 34 So. 2d 394, 397 (La. 1948)). 
 179. See LA. CONST. (1921). 
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amended 536 times, virtually no one but a few scholars felt the 1921 
Constitution was understandable.180 
The original 1921 Constitution contained no home rule provisions, but 
home rule amendments were added for the cities of Shreveport and New 
Orleans in 1948 and 1950, respectively, and for the parishes of East Baton 
Rouge and Jefferson in 1946 and 1956, respectively.181 Two general home 
rule provisions were added in 1960 and 1968.182 Despite these home rule 
amendments, “in operation they did not result in an escape from Dillon’s 
Rule and local officials continued to trek to the state capital in pursuit of 
specific statutory authorizations.”183 
In response to Dillon’s Rule, home rule was developed. Under its 
original form, referred to as imperio or traditional home rule,184 home rule 
local governments were granted the authority to govern their local affairs, 
but they had no authority in state-wide matters.185 The judiciary continued 
to define the state–local dichotomy in a case-by-case ad hoc manner.186 
Out of concern for judicial decisions that routinely marginalized local 
governance, the American Municipal Association introduced a new form of 
home rule—legislative home rule—in the 1950s, which the National 
Municipal League revised in 1968.187 Under this form of home rule, the local 
government may exercise the entire police power of the state without 
                                                                                                             
 180. Mark T. Carleton, Elitism Sustained: The Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 
54 TUL. L. REV. 560, 563 (1980). 
 181. Richard Engstrom & Robert K. Whelan, Louisiana, in HOME RULE IN 
AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 173, 174 (Dale Krane et al. eds. 2000) 
[hereinafter, HOME RULE HANDBOOK]. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Richard L. Engstrom & Patrick F. O’Connor, State Centralization Versus 
Home Rule: A Note on Ambition Theory’s Powers Proposition, 30 W. POL. Q. 
288, 290 (1977). Dillon’s Rule is a descriptive legal principle that limits the power 
of local government to those powers that are expressly granted, necessarily or 
fairly implied or incident to the power expressly granted, or essential to the 
indispensable purposes of the local government. JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (1872). 
 184. See St. Louis v. West Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893) 
(describing imperio home rule in St. Louis under a charter appointing its powers 
as an “imperium in imperio,” or a state within a state). 
 185. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6; CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a). 
 186. See Kenneth Vanlandingham, Constitutional Municipal Home Rule Since 
the AMA (NLC) Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1975). 
 187. See NAT’L MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 16 (6th ed. 
1968).  
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concern about the state–local dichotomy, but the legislature may deny the 
local government most substantive powers via statute.188  
Led by political conservatives that favored less centralized government 
and by those with more locally directed political commitments,189 the 
delegates of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution sought to strengthen home rule 
in Louisiana to “end a period of de facto state legislative supremacy over 
local government.”190 The new 1974 Constitution created two separate 
classes of legislative home rule local governments. A local government that 
had already adopted a home rule charter when the new constitution became 
effective retained its already-possessed powers to the extent that the powers 
were consistent with the new constitution. If permitted by its charter, this 
local government would also possess the powers of other local 
governments.191  
Local governments that adopted a home rule charter after the ratification 
of the 1974 Constitution were allowed to include in their charter any powers 
“necessary, requisite, or proper for the management of [their] affairs, not 
denied by general law or inconsistent with this constitution.”192 Most home 
rule local governments in Louisiana, including St. Tammany Parish,193 
                                                                                                             
 188. See Vanlandingham, supra note 186, at 3. 
 189. See Engstrom & O’Connor, supra note 183, at 293–94. 
 190. HOME RULE HANDBOOK, supra note 181, at 173. 
 191. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4. 
 192. Id. § 5. Non-home rule local governments may exercise the same general 
powers as post-1974 home rule local governments not denied by general laws or 
inconsistent with the Constitution, except that a majority of the voting electorate 
must approve general powers because they have not already incorporated in the 
home rule charter. See id. § 7. As described in R. Gordon Kean, Jr., Local 
Government and Home Rule, 21 LOY. L. REV. 63 (1975), the four categories of 
local governments under the scheme of Article VI, are: (1) non-home rule local 
governments operating under state charters, existing general law, or the Lawrason 
Act, Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 33:321 to :481; (2) non-home rule local 
governments exercising home rule powers by a vote of electors; (3) local 
governments that adopt a new home rule charter after the 1974 Constitution; and 
(4) home rule governments that continue to exist under charters adopted before 
the 1974 Constitution. Id. at 67–68. The Lawrason Act provides that a mayor-
board of alderman governs all municipalities, other than those that a special 
legislative charter or a home rule charter governs. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:321 
(2013). 
 193. St. Tammany voters approved the parish’s first charter in 1979, but that 
charter was repealed in 1983, reverting the parish to a regular police jury system. 
BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, THE ST. TAMMANY PARISH HOME RULE 
CHARTER: AN ASSESSMENT 4 (May 2002). A new charter was adopted in 1998. 
Id. at 5. 
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adopted their home rule charter after 1974, and thus fall under the National 
Municipal League legislative home rule model. 
B. Judicial Invigoration of Louisiana Home Rule 
In what many commentators considered a landmark decision, Justice 
James L. Dennis, writing for the City of New Orleans majority, found the 
distinction between pre-1974 and post-1974 home rule governments 
significant.194 According to Justice Dennis, not only were pre-1974 home 
rule governments not limited by the requirement that ordinances be 
“necessary, requisite or proper for the management of [their] affairs” in 
contrast to post-1974 home rule government,195 but they also were not 
necessarily restrained by inconsistent state “general laws.”196 To the extent 
earlier cases found differently, Justice Dennis considered those findings 
nonessential to their holdings and mere dicta.197 
The rights and powers of these pre-1974 home rule local governments 
are vast—but not absolute—under article VI, section 9(b) of the 1974 
Constitution. That provision provides that “[n]otwithstanding any provision 
of this Article, the police power of the state shall never be abridged.”198 
                                                                                                             
 194. 640 So. 2d 237, 243–44 (La. 1994). 
 195. Id. at 244 (internal quotations omitted). 
 196. Id. at 247. A state law is a general law, and not a local or special law, if 
its operation extends to the whole state. Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 
2d 1, 17 (La. 2001). In contrast, a local law is a law that operates only in a 
particular area or locality without the possibility of extending to other localities 
or areas, and a special law is a law that “operates upon and affects only a fraction 
of the persons or a portion of the property encompassed by a classification, 
granting privileges to some while denying them to others.” Id. at 18. 
 197. City of New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at 257. In so holding, the court 
essentially overrules one of its earlier decisions. Id. at 247 (“We reject the notion 
suggested by the lead opinion in City of New Orleans v. State, 426 So. 2d 1318, 
1320–21 (La. 1983), that Article VI, § 4 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution adopts 
by implied reference a 1921 constitutional provision that requires the [local 
government’s] exercise of its home rule power to yield to any inconsistent general 
state law.”). The court characterizes City of New Orleans as “simply wrong and 
has been subject to cogent judicial and scholarly criticism.” 640 So. 2d at 255. 
 198. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 9(B). The principle that the police power of the state 
shall not be abridged does not need to be stated in the constitution. “[T]he ‘police 
power’ is the legislative authority enjoyed by the states, i.e. not constitutionally 
delegated to the federal government or constitutionally appropriated by the federal 
Congress, as the residuary sovereigns in our federal system.” City of Baton Rouge 
v. Ross, 654 So. 2d 1311, 1319 n.10 (La. 1995) (emphasis in original). “This 
corresponds to the ‘general principle of judicial interpretation that, unlike the 
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Although Justice Dennis viewed this language as ambiguous, he concluded 
that courts must construe the broad home rule powers granted to pre-1974 
home rule local governments in harmony with state laws,199 which is a 
difficult task when otherwise valid local ordinances conflict directly with 
state law.  
Pre-1974 home rule local governments have a power of immunity “to 
act without fear of the supervisory authority of the state government.”200 For 
these home rule entities, the court must first determine whether the local law 
at issue conflicts with state law. If the local law conflicts, the state law will 
preempt the local law only if the state law is necessary to protect a vital 
interest of the state as a whole.201 For a state statute to be necessary, the 
proponent must show that the protection of the vital state interest “cannot be 
achieved through alternate means significantly less detrimental to home rule 
powers and rights.”202 
One might argue that, despite the admonition of Justice Dennis, a pre-
1974 home rule government still has no power to regulate oil and gas 
operations because it had no such powers when the 1974 Constitution was 
adopted. Section 4 of the 1974 Constitution states that “each local 
governmental subdivision which has adopted such a home rule charter or 
plan of government shall retain the powers . . . in effect when this 
constitution is adopted.”203 The 1974 Constitution post-dated the current 
version of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:28(F), which was adopted 
in 1959, by 15 years.204 As discussed above, the Fifth Circuit held that 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:28(F) repudiates local authority to 
regulate both where oil and gas wells may be located and how they might 
be drilled.205 Accordingly, pre-1974 home rule governments lacked the 
power to regulate oil and gas drilling when the 1974 Constitution was 
adopted, a deprivation that continued unaffected.  
City of New Orleans, however, counsels to the contrary. According to 
Justice Dennis, the test is not whether a pre-1974 local home rule 
government had the power to regulate when the 1974 Constitution was 
                                                                                                             
federal constitution, a state’s constitution’s provisions are not grants of power but 
instead are limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the people of a state 
exercised through its legislature.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Directors of La. Recovery 
Dist. v. Taxpayers, 529 So. 2d 384, 387 (La 1988)). 
 199. City of New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at 252. 
 200. Id. at 242. 
 201. Id. at 252. 
 202. Id. 
 203. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (emphasis added). 
 204. See Act. No. 66, § 1, 1959 La. Acts 204. 
 205. See supra Part III.B. 
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adopted, because “the drafters and ratifiers intended to emancipate and 
continue in effect the preexisting home rule charters free of the conditions 
and restraints that had been placed upon them by the 1921 Constitution.”206 
According to Justice Dennis, only the terms of the 1974 Constitution limit 
the powers of preexisting home rule governments set forth in their charters, 
including any amendments to those charters adopted in accordance with 
those charters.207 After City of New Orleans, the 1974 Constitution allows 
such local governments to regulate in areas of state-wide concern so long as 
conflicting state laws are not “necessary” to protect the “vital” interests of 
the state as a whole.208 
Under these principles, courts, rather than the legislature, must 
determine when a state interest is relatively vital or relatively nonessential 
along a spectrum, giving liberal deference to pre-1974 home rule power. In 
the case of City of New Orleans itself, Justice Dennis concluded that the 
state’s interest in allowing the Orleans Levy District to construct, maintain, 
and operate a marina on state land at South Shore Harbor was not sufficient 
to prevent the City from enforcing violations of its zoning ordinances and 
the Levy District’s building codes.209 Based solely on City of New Orleans, 
a pre-1974 home rule local government might credibly argue that it has the 
power to regulate the location of wells despite the express preemption 
provision. 
C. Judicial Re-marginalization of Louisiana Home Rule 
Despite Justice Dennis’s persuasive rhetoric, home rule was not freed 
from the shackles of Dillon’s Rule as some predicted.210 Later precedent 
interpreting City of New Orleans often reverts to a standard more tolerant of 
conflicting state legislation, finding preemption based on state interests that 
                                                                                                             
 206. City of New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at 245. 
 207. Id. at 245–46. 
 208. The 1974 Louisiana Constitution contains other exceptions that prohibit 
localities from providing for the punishment of a felony, enacting ordinances 
governing private relationships, reducing the compensation of an elected official, 
and establishing or affecting courts. LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 9(A)(1)–(2), 12, 25. 
The City of New Orleans court also recognized that local ordinances may not be 
applied in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory manner. 640 So. 2d at 255. 
 209. 640 So. 2d at 254. 
 210. See generally Gerald S. Janoff, Comment, City of New Orleans v. Board 
of Commissioners: The Louisiana Supreme Court Frees New Orleans from the 
Shackles of Dillon’s Rule, 69 TUL. L. REV. 809 (1995). 
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arguably are less than necessary to protect state interests that may be less 
than vital.211 
For example, in the post-City of New Orleans case, Morial v. Smith & 
Wesson Corp.,212 the Louisiana Supreme Court sustained a state law that 
prohibited local governments from suing a slew of gun manufacturers for 
damages related to the sale of firearms.213 Rather than asking whether the 
state interest was “vital” or whether the state legislation was “necessary” in 
light of available alternatives, the court asked the rather deferential question 
of whether the state law represented a reasonable and valid exercise of the 
police power.214 The Smith & Wesson court concluded that statewide 
regulation of the firearms industry “tends” towards preserving public safety 
and welfare.215 In his dissent, Chief Justice Calogero argued that, not only 
did the state law fail to even attempt to prevent an evil or preserve public 
health or welfare, but the law also harmed public welfare by restricting the 
public’s right to recover damages for injury.216 
Later, in New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New 
Orleans,217 the Louisiana Supreme Court found that a Louisiana statute that 
prohibited a local governmental subdivision from establishing a minimum 
wage preempted a minimum wage amendment to the City of New Orleans’ 
charter.218 The majority opinion, written by Justice Kimball, diverged 
widely from the principles that Justice Dennis laid down in City of New 
Orleans. First, Justice Kimball stated that the Louisiana Constitution does 
not differentiate between pre-1974 and post-1974 home rule charters on the 
issue of the abridgement of the state’s police power.219 Second, Justice 
Kimball stated that the relevant test should ask whether the legislature’s 
exercise of the police power was reasonable, giving great weight to the 
legislature’s determination and refusing to substitute the court’s opinion for 
the opinion of the legislature.220 Chief Justice Calogero, in concurrence, 
would have struck down the local law as violating the prohibition against 
                                                                                                             
 211. See, e.g., City of Baton Rouge v. Ross, 654 So. 2d 1311, 1318–19 (La. 1995). 
 212. 785 So. 2d 1 (La. 2001). For a detailed discussion of Morial, see Eric 
Womack, Comment, A Revolution in Local Government Law: Recognizing the 
Home Rule Implications of Municipality Suits Against Gun Manufacturers, 5 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 255 (2001). 
 213. 785 So. 2d at 19.  
 214. Id. at 15. 
 215. Id. at 16. 
 216. Id. at 21. 
 217. 825 So. 2d 1098 (La. 2002). 
 218. Id. at 1108. 
 219. Id. at 1105. 
 220. Id. 
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regulation of private relationships,221 and Justice Johnson, in dissent, would 
have allowed the local law to stand.222 Both of these two justices, however, 
recognized that the majority marginalized any distinction between pre-1974 
and post-1974 home rule local governments.223 
The reasonableness test as used to measure the state’s power to preempt 
local government under the “nonabridgement” clause of the 1974 
Constitution actually originated 10 years before Justice Dennis formulated the 
necessary and vital test in City of New Orleans. In Francis v. Morial,224 the 
Louisiana Supreme Court considered a state statute that required the two 
cities and a parish to choose members of the Louisiana aviation board.225 
The Francis court stated that it would sustain state legislation against 
conflicting local law if the operation of the state law “tends in some degree 
to prevent an offense or evil or otherwise to preserve public health, morals, 
safety or welfare . . . .”226 The state law nevertheless was struck down in that 
case largely because that law affected the governance of the home rule city, 
which is a direct affront to the concept of home rule power.227 
The judiciary continues to be suspicious of state laws that abridge the 
governance or structure of home rule local governments.228 In the realm of 
zoning and police power regulation, however, Louisiana courts have 
afforded state laws considerable deference despite City of New Orleans.229 
                                                                                                             
 221. Id. at 1108–09 (Calogero, J., concurring in the decree, dissenting from the 
majority’s reasons). 
 222. Id. at 1124–25 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 223. See id. at 1110 (Calogero, J., concurring in the decree but dissenting from 
the majority’s reasons) (“Similarly, the judiciary in deciding whether a local 
government’s legislation abridges the state’s police power must do more than 
merely rely on the legislature’s pronouncement that a matter is true ‘statewide’ 
concern . . . . To accept such a statement at face value would effectively place 
pre–1974 home rule charter cities on the same constitutional footing as post–1974 
cities, insofar as the legislature’s ability to override local legislation by simply 
passing an inconsistent ‘general’ law.”); id. at 1123–24 (Johnson, J., dissenting) 
(“The questions we must resolve are these: Does [the state statute] protect a vital 
or compelling state interest? If so, can that state interest be achieved through less 
drastic alternatives?”).  
 224. 455 So. 2d 1168 (La. 1984). 
 225. Id. at 1170. 
 226. Id. at 1172–73 (emphasis added). 
 227. See id. at 1174. 
 228. The 1974 Constitution states that a home rule charter shall provide “the 
structure and organization, powers, and functions” of the local government. LA. 
CONST. art. VI, § 5(E). 
 229. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Dirs. of the La. State Museum, 
739 So. 2d 748 (La. 1999) (holding that Vieux Carre Commission of New Orleans 
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The state law could favor a particular industry to the alleged detriment of 
public welfare and safety, as in the case of Smith & Wesson, or the state law 
could simply conflict with local laws.  
In a few cases since City of New Orleans, however, Louisiana courts 
have protected local power in the face of potentially conflicting state 
statutes.230 For example, in St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc. v. Riverboat 
Gaming Commission,231 decided a year after City of New Orleans, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court held that a zoning ordinance that restricted 
riverboat gaming activity was not invalid on its face.232 The State Riverboat 
Gaming Commission issued a permit to the plaintiff to conduct gambling 
operations at a specific site on the batture233 and sued the parish council to 
enjoin the parish from enforcing its zoning ordinance.234 In effect, the court 
recognized the distinction between process and land use. It distinguished 
between gambling, which is regulated by the legislature, and zoning, which 
is a valid activity of the local government that was not denied by the state 
legislature.235  
As noted above, the Louisiana Constitution states that it protects local 
governments from state legislative action except by general state laws that 
deny local authority, rather than merely conflict with local law.236 In the 
context of oil and gas production, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
30:28(F) denies local authority with respect to permitted oil and gas wells.237 
                                                                                                             
acted unreasonably in requiring state to comply with permit procedures); Merritt 
McDonald Constr., Inc. v. Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 742 So. 2d 564 (La. Ct. App. 
1999) (striking down contractor licensure requirements of home rule parish as 
conflicting with state licensure requirements). 
 230. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Dirs. of the La. State Museum, 
709 So. 2d 1008 (La. Ct. App. 1998), vacated by 739 So. 2d 748. The Court of 
Appeal required the state to comply with the city’s permitting procedure, but the 
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the city abridged the state’s police power. 
739 So. 2d at 758.  
 231. 648 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1995). 
 232. Id. at 1312. 
 233. A “batture” is “[s]oil, stone, or other material that builds under water and 
may or may not break the surface.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 173 (9th ed. 
2009). 
 234. St. Charles Gaming, 648 So. 2d at 1312. 
 235. Id. at 1317. 
 236. City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm’rs of the Orleans Levee Dist., 640 
So. 2d 237, 248 (La. 1994). 
 237. “No other agency or political subdivision of the state shall have the 
authority, and they are hereby expressly forbidden, to prohibit or in any way 
interfere with the drilling of a well or test well in search of minerals by the holder 
of such a permit.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:28(F) (2007). 
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Louisiana Revised Statutes section 33:4780.49 also denies the local 
authority of parishes, but not municipalities, over activities authorized under 
state or federal permits.238 Local governments might argue, based on the 
distinction between process and land use, that the purpose of the preemption 
statute relates only to the technical operations of oil and gas wells and that 
zoning ordinances do not implicate those operations. To succeed based on 
such an argument would require a strong presumption in favor of local 
authority. However, such a presumption appears to have eroded somewhat 
since City of New Orleans. The Francis standard asks little more than 
whether a conflicting state law is a general law. Although this is the test 
applicable to most legislative home rule local governments, it hardly sets 
Louisiana apart as a home rule innovator. 
V. PROCESS AND LAND USE OVERLAP IN THE OIL AND GAS CONTEXT  
The ideal level of local autonomy over the location of oil and gas wells 
has been the subject of scholarly interest. For example, in a recent article, 
Professor David Spence cogently argued that allowing local governments to 
veto fracking or drilling may result in more optimal utility and reach the 
most efficient outcome, but only “if local governments can capture more of 
the benefits of production” in the form of impact or other fees or additional 
taxes.239 Although costs and benefits of production usually are shared state-
wide, thus favoring state-level preemption, Professor Spence argues that to 
maximize collective utility, one should take into account not just the 
preferences of state residents in the aggregate, but also the intensity of 
preferences, which may be stronger at the local level.240 
In response to Professor Spence, Professor Fershee makes perhaps the 
most important point in the debate: that states do retain the ability to decide 
whether local governments may ban fracking or drilling by preemption and 
that courts should and usually do respect those policy choices.241 Even when 
a state legislature acts to preempt local government actions, however, the 
legislature must be very clear. At least in the context of fracking, courts 
recently have tended to protect local power in the absence of legislative 
                                                                                                             
 238. “[N]o [parish] shall . . . restrict, conflict with, interfere with, or supersede 
activities operating in accordance with authorized state or federal permits, laws, 
or regulations.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4780.49 (2009). 
 239. David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
351, 353 (2014). 
 240. Id. at 412. 
 241. Joshua P. Fershee, How Local is Local?: A Response to Professor David 
B. Spence’s The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 61, 62–63 
(2015).  
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clarity, particularly in their recognition of the distinction between process 
and land use.242  
There are a number of arguments, however, why the state, rather than 
the local government, should be the ultimate decision maker as to when and 
where drilling should occur.243 For example, local governments may be 
more subject to interest group pressure than state governments, which must 
take into account a broader range of interests. Local governments may also 
fail to account for the interests of underrepresented mineral owners. This 
problem arises in part because surface owners, renters, and other non-
mineral owning residents—the large majority of voters to whom local 
politicians must be responsive—realize very little of the economic benefits 
of production in their neighborhood.244 Local bans create free-rider 
problems,245 particularly in states where oil and gas operations generate the 
majority of revenues and other economic benefits that are distributed more 
evenly throughout the state. In contrast, local governments bear the vast 
majority of externality costs246 from truck traffic, noise, boom and bust 
cycles, etc.247 These governments may benefit economically from local 
employment and local taxes, but a large portion of the economic benefits 
generated in a local government jurisdiction that allows oil and gas 
production often flows to residents of other sub-state entities.248  
Perhaps most persuasive, however, is that process and land use overlap 
in the oil and gas context, meaning that where oil and gas is produced also 
implicates how and whether oil and gas will be produced and whether it will 
be fairly allocated. 
Scholars and courts generally recognize the distinction between land 
use as a local interest and process as a state interest. For example, Louisiana 
State University Law Professor Kenneth Murchison has advised against 
preemption where the purpose of state regulation is to govern processes and 
practices, rather than the type of comprehensive planning that is the subject 
                                                                                                             
 242. See Ritchie, supra note 83; see generally Kramer, supra note 6. 
 243. See Alex Ritchie, On Local Fracking Bans: Policy and Preemption in 
New Mexico, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 255, 299 (2014). 
 244. Id. at 297–98. 
 245. Free-rider problems arise when market participants enjoy the benefits 
associated with a public good without having to pay their fair share for the good. 
See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 109 (1988). 
 246. An externality may be described as a cost or benefit that is not internalized 
by the applicable actor, in this case the oil and gas industry. NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD 
& CHARLES C. CALDART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS: 
RECLAIMING THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA 132 (2008). 
 247. Ritchie, supra note 243, at 282–83. 
 248. Id. at 285–87. 
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of sound zoning practices.249 In the Palermo case, the local government 
down-zoned the land of the defendants—who intended to sell their parcels 
for a solid waste landfill—from heavy industrial to light industrial, which 
prohibited the intended use for the land and precluded its sale.250 The 
defendants pointed to state environmental regulation, but the court found no 
provisions that expressly preempted the local zoning regulation. In fact, 
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (“LDEQ”) regulations 
required that the proposed use could not violate local land use requirements 
as a precondition to obtaining a solid waste disposal permit.251 The Palermo 
court then discussed whether the Louisiana statutory scheme impliedly 
preempted the local regulation, finding that the focus of the Office of Solid 
and Hazardous Waste was to regulate “solid waste disposal practices,” not 
zoning.252 In other words, the practice of solid waste disposal was a process 
appropriately regulated by the state, not land use. 
The dividing line under the law, however, is not so precise where oil 
and gas wells are concerned. In the implied preemption context, it is often 
stated that a local law is preempted when the state law allows something the 
local law prohibits, and vice versa.253 The language of this test, however, 
provides only a theoretical degree of certainty. A drilling permit is an 
authorization to drill in a particular location, and a local zoning ordinance 
may prohibit drilling in that very same location. Jurisdictions without an 
express preemption provision—and at least one jurisdiction with an express 
preemption provision254—allow this direct conflict under the rationale that 
the purpose of local land use is very different from the purpose of state 
conservation statutes. 
Courts routinely distinguish between the purpose of state conservation 
statutes and the purpose of local land use ordinances. Land use concerns 
the preservation of the character of neighborhoods and furthers the 
comprehensive plans of the local government.255 By contrast, state 
conservation statutes are focused primarily on the prevention of waste of 
                                                                                                             
 249. Kenneth M. Murchison, Local Government Law, 52 LA. L. REV. 541, 552 
(1992). 
 250. Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm’n of Calcasieu Parish, 561 So. 2d 
482, 484 (La. 1990). 
 251. Id. at 498 (citing LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, pt. 6, § 1107(B)(1)). 
 252. 561 So. 2d at 498 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2152 (2000)). 
 253. Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde, 896 N.E.2d 967, 971 
(Ohio 2008); Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council, 964 A.2d 855, 862 
(Pa. 2009); Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 199 P.3d 718, 725 
(Colo. 2009). 
 254. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra Part III.A. 
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oil and gas and the protection of correlative rights. Unfortunately, however, 
these purposes overlap in the oil and gas context in a way that justifies a 
degree of state preemptive power over local restrictions on the location of 
wells. 
“Waste” of oil and gas is defined to include physical waste and 
economic waste. Physical waste may result from inefficient use of reservoir 
energy or excessive production rates. Economic waste may result from 
drilling more wells than are required or when oil or gas is sold at too low a 
price.256 By contrast, “correlative rights” is a term that describes acceptable 
standards of conduct for operations in a common source of supply, 
recognizing that actions of one producer have an effect on the rights of 
others.257 In Louisiana, correlative rights of a mineral owner include the 
opportunity to produce a fair share of the common reservoir, and the right 
to utilize natural reservoir energy.258 Correlative rights also prohibit a person 
operating in a common reservoir from intentionally or negligently depriving 
another owner in the common reservoir of his rights or negligently causing 
him harm.259  
The conservation agency may protect these correlative rights using any 
number of tools, including the allocation of allowable production in a 
common pool,260 and the establishment of drilling units in a manner that 
allows a producer to produce no more than his just and equitable share of 
the pool.261 Although the primary duty of the conservation agency is to 
prevent waste to promote the full and efficient development of the state’s 
mineral resources,262 the agency also has the power and duty to protect 
                                                                                                             
 256. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, 
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 1133 (13th ed. 2012). Some states, including 
Louisiana, define waste only by reference to physical waste. See LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 30:3 (2007) (“‘Waste’, in addition to its ordinary meanings, means 
‘physical waste’ as that term is generally understood in the oil and gas industry.”). 
 257. See Eugene E. Kuntz, Correlative Rights of Parties Owning Interest in a 
Common Source of Supply of Oil or Gas, 17 INST. OIL & GAS LAW & TAX’N 217, 
224–25 (1966). 
 258. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:9 & cmt. (2000). 
 259. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:10. 
 260. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:11. 
 261. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:9(A). The conservation agency’s power to 
establish drilling units to protect the source of the supply for the common owners 
is a constitutional exercise of the state’s police powers. See Ohio Oil Co. v. 
Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209–11 (1899); Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d 495, 
506 (La. 1942). 
 262. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2 to :4; Exxon Corp. v. Thompson, 564 
So. 2d 387, 394 (La. Ct. App. 1990). The duty to protect correlative rights is 
addressed differently in different state conservation statutes. For example, in 
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correlative rights, and more generally, to make any reasonable rule, 
regulation, or order necessary to administer and enforce the conservation 
law.263 
In Matter of Wallach, the New York Court of Appeals in part based its 
decision to allow local oil and gas bans on the distinction between the 
purposes under state conservation law of waste prevention and correlative 
rights protection and the local purposes of zoning and land use.264 The court 
states that “[t]he [oil and gas law’s] overriding concern with preventing 
waste is limited to inefficient or improper drilling activities that result in the 
unnecessary waste of natural resources. Nothing in the statute points to the 
conclusion that a municipality’s decision not to permit drilling equates to 
waste.”265 Thus, according to the New York Court of Appeals, oil and gas 
that is still in the ground is not wasted, at least under the statutory meaning 
of the conservation laws. With little elaboration, the court similarly 
concluded that correlative rights are not implicated by the inability of an 
owner within a jurisdiction to drill at all.266 Drilling bans, however, cause 
waste and implicate correlative rights, particularly because of the 
extraterritorial effects. 
As the Colorado Supreme Court observed in Voss v. Lundvall Brothers, 
Inc.,267 a municipal ban may increase the cost of drilling when the pool of 
oil or gas may be accessed only from outside the jurisdiction, which results 
in economic waste.268 A ban may also result in physical waste. Drilling 
permits are issued by the state at locations intended to maximize production. 
If oil and gas is only produced outside the jurisdiction that bans production, 
it may be produced in an inefficient pattern or significant oil and gas might 
be left in the ground. The Voss court recognized that a ban also prevents 
owners inside the jurisdiction of the local government from producing their 
equitable share of oil and gas from the pool.269 When a pool is located both 
inside and outside the particular local government that bans production, the 
                                                                                                             
Colorado, the definition of “waste” includes abuse of correlative rights. See COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 34-60-103(13)(c) (2006). In New York, the purpose of the conservation 
law expressly includes both the prevention of waste and the full protection of 
correlative rights. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2007). 
 263. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:4(C) (2007 & Supp. 2015). 
 264. In re Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1201–02 (N.Y. 2014). 
 265. Id. at 1196. 
 266. Id. at 1200 n.5. 
 267. 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992). 
 268. Id. at 1067. 
 269. Id. at 1068. 
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owner located outside the jurisdiction may drain the entire pool under the 
rule of capture.270 
The applicable remedy under the rule of capture is for the owner to drill 
his or her own well to offset the drainage from the property.271 That remedy, 
however, is unavailable to the owner located inside the jurisdiction of the 
local government where drilling is banned, frustrating the rule that is the 
foundation of oil and gas law.272 The owner within the jurisdiction is thus 
denied the opportunity to produce its fair and equitable share or any share at 
all. In other words, the owner is denied its correlative rights in direct 
contravention of conservation statutes.273 
Relying on Voss, other Colorado courts have reached the same 
conclusion. In the summer of 2014, the Boulder District Court274 and the 
Larimer County District Court275 each recognized that a municipal ban on 
fracking causes waste and impairs correlative rights. The United States 
District Court for the District of New Mexico, in striking down the Mora 
County, New Mexico, oil and gas production and storage ban, also found 
                                                                                                             
 270. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 13 
(Tex. 2008) (“[The] rule [of capture] gives a mineral rights owner title to the oil 
and gas produced from a lawful well bottomed on the property, even if the oil and 
gas flowed to the well from beneath another owner’s tract.”). 
 271. Id. at 14. 
 272. See id. at 14 n.41 (“[T]he owner of the adjoining tract from which the oil 
is migrating can protect himself by drilling offset wells. This equal right to drill 
has always supported the constitutionality of the rule of capture. Take it away and 
the reason for the rule fails, leaving a result not only unjust but one inconsistent 
with the fundamental concept of ownership of oil and gas in place as a part of the 
realty.” (quoting Ryan Consol. Petrol. Corp. v. Pickens, 285 S.W.2d 201, 210 
(Tex. 1955) (Wilson, J., dissenting))). 
 273. See Ritchie, supra note 243, at 310–11. 
 274. See Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Colo. Oil & Gas 
Ass’n v. City of Lafayette, 2014 WL 7666285 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 2014) (No. 
13CV31746) [hereinafter Lafayette Order]; Order Granting Motions for Summary 
Judgment at 13, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, 2014 WL 3690665 
(Colo. Dist. Ct. 2014) (No. 13CV63) [hereinafter Longmont Order]. Interestingly, 
correlative rights were impaired in Longmont because a unit was formed that 
included acreage inside and outside Longmont, but the oil and gas company was 
not allowed to frack the portion of the well inside Longmont. Under state law, 
owners of mineral interests were thus allocated proceeds from the production of 
the well based on their percentage ownership of the unit but were not actually 
contributing acreage to the well. Longmont Order, supra, at 13. 
 275. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on First Claim 
for Relief and Denying Defendant’s Cross-Motion of Summary Judgment at 5–6, 
Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Ft. Collins, 2014 WL 7666284 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 
2014) (No. 13CV31385) [hereinafter Ft. Collins Order]. 
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that such a ban frustrates the state conservation law purposes of waste 
prevention and correlative rights protection, as well as the overall statutory 
scheme regulating oil and gas.276 Interestingly, all of these courts also 
recognized that the state statutory scheme left room for reasonable zoning 
and land use restrictions. 
Arguably, any zoning or other restrictions on where wells might be 
located may impair correlative rights or result in waste. Even a traditional 
zoning pattern that separates uses into districts may prohibit drilling at the 
most efficient and effective location for production or deny one or more 
owners their just and equitable share of production. Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 30:28(F) and the EMC 1 court’s interpretation of that statute 
address that reality. 
VI. COMPROMISE AND PARTICIPATION AS ALTERNATIVES 
TO LOCAL CONTROL 
As argued above, policy should vest the state with the ultimate decision-
making authority as to the where and how wells are drilled and completed. 
Local governments and their citizenry, however, should have their 
legitimate concerns heard and considered, even in circumstances where all 
such concerns cannot be addressed to their satisfaction. Industry itself may 
give voice to at least some local concerns through direct negotiation and 
compromise or more passively by not legally challenging reasonable local 
regulations. At the state level, local citizens are given a voice when the LOC 
considers their concerns in balancing environmental costs and benefits along 
with economic, social, and other factors in making permitting decisions. 
Although the state might be unresponsive to such environmental 
considerations in the absence of a mandate, the Louisiana Constitution 
arguably provides such a mandate. This Part discusses these opportunities 
for a local voice in the absence of local control. 
A. Cooperative Governance or Compromise 
Some commentators have called for cooperation between local 
governments and industry or between state and local governments in the 
siting and permitting of wells.277 Cooperation implies working together 
                                                                                                             
 276. SWEPI, LP v. Mora Cnty., No. CIV 14–0035 JB/SCY, 2015 WL 365923, 
at *102–03 (D.N.M. Jan. 19, 2015). 
 277. See John R. Nolan & Steven E. Gavin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption, 
Local Power, and Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 995, 1036–
39 (2013). Professor Nolan and his former student argue that state agencies could 
assist communities by providing technical assistance. They also describe a system 
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towards an end,278 which will usually prove difficult between oil and gas 
companies that want to drill at efficient locations and communities that want 
to ban oil and gas drilling entirely. Cooperation in such circumstances might 
be better termed “mutually beneficial compromise.” 
To achieve compromise, both parties must feel at least some pressure to 
negotiate. Compromise may be more difficult in Louisiana than in other oil-
and-gas-producing states because of the preeminent authority of the LOC to 
regulate both process and location under EMC 1 and EMC 2. Even so, at 
least some local regulation may co-exist with state regulation, even in a state 
such as Louisiana with a strong express preemption provision. One can 
expect oil and gas companies to voluntarily comply with reasonable 
restrictions to avoid jeopardizing their social license to operate in the 
community.279 In this respect, cooperation in Louisiana by the state and 
industry with local governments to craft reasonable local regulation is not 
impossible.  
Former Caddo Parish Attorney Charles C. Grubb explains the story of 
how Caddo Parish regulated oil and gas operations in the face of increased 
drilling in the Haynesville Shale.280 After considering Louisiana’s preemption 
statute, Caddo Parish decided to take an expansive view of its regulatory 
authority while avoiding regulations that proscribe well locations or that 
regulate the process of drilling, stimulating, or completing a well—referred 
to as “down-hole” regulation.281 Instead, Caddo Parish regulates matters 
such as site access, dust, vibration, lighting, exhaust fumes, signage, use of 
public water supplies, discharges, aesthetics, operating hours, noise, and 
road usage.282  
In crafting its oil and gas ordinances, Caddo Parish involved industry in 
discussions. In the view of Caddo Parish, industry would not risk 
confrontation with communities to challenge reasonable regulations that the 
                                                                                                             
in New York relating to the siting of major electric generating facilities that 
provides for preemption of local control but allows for local input. Id. at 1038. 
 278. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (9th ed. 2009). 
 279. See Kieren Moffat & Airong Zhang, The Paths to Social License to 
Operate: An Integrative Model Explaining Community Acceptance of Mining, 39 
RESOURCES POL’Y 61, 61 (2014). 
 280. Charles C. Grubb, Getting Ahead of Drilling Companies in the Haynesville 
Shale, The Caddo Parish, Louisiana, Experience, in BEYOND THE FRACKING WARS: 
A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PLANNERS, AND CITIZENS 213, 213–20 
(Erica L. Powers & Beth E. Kinne eds., 2013). 
 281. Id. at 215–17. 
 282. See, e.g., CADDO PARISH, LA., POLICE JURY CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 34-
1 to 34-55 (2009) (oil, gas, and hydrocarbon wells); id. §§ 26-155 to 26-162 
(commercial vehicle enforcement); id. §§ 32-160 to 32-166 (noise). 
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public supports.283 Grubb also reported that the LDNR and the 
Commissioner of Conservation worked cooperatively with the Parish.284 
Due to these efforts, Grubb reports that the citizens of Caddo Parish have 
enjoyed the economic benefits attendant with Haynesville Shale production 
without significant harm to the environment.285 
Bossier Parish,286 the City of Bossier,287 DeSoto Parish,288 the City of 
Shreveport,289 and probably many other local governments in Louisiana all 
regulate certain aspects of oil and gas operations either directly or indirectly 
through local ordinances.290 One can expect the trend of locally regulating 
oil and gas operations in the Haynesville Shale, which began in 2009, to 
spread to the Tuscaloosa Marine Shale area as that area is further 
developed.291 
Further, the state should be willing to voluntarily appease local 
governments to some extent when officials believe they can avoid the 
political risk of local opposition while also limiting the impact on their 
authority. For example, in Colorado, local government frustration led to 
Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper’s creation of an oil and gas task 
force to address concerns of local governments. The task force submitted 
nine proposals to the Governor, two of which require legislation, and the 
remainder of which can be implemented by agency regulation.292 One 
                                                                                                             
 283. Grubb, supra note 280, at 217. 
 284. Id. at 222. 
 285. Id. at 223. 
 286. See, e.g., BOSSIER PARISH, LA., POLICE JURY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 94-
10 (2013) (commercial vehicle enforcement); id. §§ 46-34 to 46-41 (noise). 
 287. See, e.g., BOSSIER CITY, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 46-141 to 46-147 
(2009) (gas and other hydrocarbon well operations). 
 288. See, e.g., DESOTO PARISH, LA., POLICE JURY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 78-
9 (2010) (requiring the repair of excess damage to roads by motor vehicles, 
including for the drilling of oil or gas wells). 
 289. See, e.g., SHREVEPORT, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 251-1 to 25-31 
(2009) (oil, gas, and other hydrocarbon well operations); id. § 25-29 (noise). 
 290. See Jerry N. Jones, Local Regulation in Louisiana’s Haynesville Shale, 
BRADLEY, MURCHISON, KELLY, & SHEA LLC, http://www.bradleyfirm.com/files 
/shale.pps [perma.cc/RKB6-N8EL] (last visited Nov. 17, 2015). 
 291. As of February 22, 2015, the Tuscaloosa Marine Shale contained only 37 
active wells. See Tuscaloosa Marine Shale Map, LA. DEP’T NATURAL RES., 
http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=909 
[perma.cc/4PDS-NPSZ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
 292. See Mark Jaffe, Colorado Oil, Gas Task Force Sends 9 Measures on to 
Governor’s Desk, DENVER POST (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.denverpost.com 
/business/ci_27592566/colorado-oil-gas-task-force-sends-9-measures [perma.cc/7JK 
W-XVNJ]. 
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proposal limits the impact of large-scale operations on multi-well drilling 
pads and gives local governments the right to negotiate the location of such 
sites.293 Another proposal requires oil and gas companies to provide 
forward-looking information about their development plans to local 
governments to facilitate local land use planning.294 Other proposals add 
inspection staff, require a study of oil and gas vehicle traffic, and create a 
statewide information clearinghouse.295 Overall, the proposals give local 
governments more of a consulting role and even more of a right to 
participate in the planning process, but leave final permitting decisions to 
the state.296 
B. Local Participation in the Drilling Decision: The Natural Resources 
Article to the Louisiana Constitution 
In addition to the challenges brought against the state and Helis with 
respect to the proposed well in St. Tammany Parish,297 Abita Springs 
brought suit against the LOC, arguing that the LOC failed to adequately 
address article IX, section 1 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution—the 
Natural Resources Article298—in its findings and decision to grant a drilling 
                                                                                                             
 293. KEYSTONE CENTER, COLORADO OIL AND GAS TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT 
5 (2015), available at http://dnr.state.co.us/OGTASKFORCE/Pages/home.aspx 
[perma.cc/8FCM-6QAD]. 
 294. Id. at 9. 
 295. See id. at 12, 16, 17. 
 296. Colorado’s willingness to work with local governments, however, has not 
been a panacea for environmental activists. The Governor created the task force as 
a political compromise to ward off amendments to the Colorado Constitution that 
would have overturned court preemption decisions and allowed local governments 
the right to ban oil and gas production. See Lynn Bartels, Let’s Make a Deal: How 
Colorado Came to a Fracking Compromise, DENVER POST (Aug. 23, 2014), 
http://www.denverpost.com/election2014/ci_26394883/lets-make-deal-how-colora 
do-came-fracking-compromise [perma.cc/8ZQV-J7C3]. Environmental activists 
are not happy with the proposals, and have vowed to go back to the ballot initiative 
process if local governments are not given the right to ban oil and gas production in 
their communities. See Dan Boyce, Task Force Proposes Fracking Rules to 
Colorado Governor, NPR (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/02/27/3894 
54418/task-force-proposes-fracking-rules-to-colorado-governor [perma.cc/YT4G-
66TW]. 
 297. See supra Part I. 
 298. The Natural Resources Article states: “The natural resources of the state, 
including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of 
the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible 
and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature 
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permit to Helis.299 On August 10, 2015, District Judge Timothy Kelley ruled 
for Abita Springs, vacating the drilling permit and remanding to the LOC to 
specifically address dangers associated with the existence of a fault line near 
the drilling site, a cost benefit analysis, and an alternative site analysis.300 If 
the recent victory of Abita Springs in the 19th Judicial District Court stands, 
that decision will be a significant development for local communities. The 
decision appears to mitigate the harsh implications for local governments of 
total preemption under EMC 1 and EMC 2. 
In Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control 
Commission,301 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that this Natural 
Resources Article imposes a duty on the legislature and on all state 
government agencies to protect the environment.302 But the environment is 
not considered in isolation of other important public policies. The court stated 
that the “insofar as possible” language created a rule of reasonableness that 
requires agencies to balance economic, social, and other factors along with 
environmental costs and benefits. To conduct this balancing, an agency must 
actually analyze adverse environmental impacts in advance, before granting a 
permit, to determine that those impacts “have been minimized or avoided as 
much as possible consistently with the public welfare.”303 
                                                                                                             
shall enact laws to implement this policy.” LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (emphasis 
added). The public trust concept in the 1974 Louisiana Constitution was continued 
from the 1921 Louisiana Constitution, which provided: “The natural resources of 
the State shall be protected, conserved and replenished.” LA. CONST. art. VI, § 1 
(1921). 
 299. Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Judicial Review at 12, Town of Abita 
Springs v. Welsh, No. 637209 (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 2015). 
 300. Oral Reasons for Judgment on Exceptions Filed on Behalf of Town of 
Abita Springs for Judicial Review, Objections to Administrative Record Filed on 
Behalf of Town of Abita Springs, and Oral Argument, Town of Abita Springs v. 
Welsh, No. 637209 (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Oral Reasons to Vacate Helis Permit].  
 301. 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984). 
 302. Id. at 1156. The Natural Resources Article does not expressly refer to 
government agencies but does expressly obligate the legislature. As such, the Save 
Ourselves court could have reasonably decided that the Natural Resources Article 
only obligates the legislature to enact affirmative environmental protection 
legislation, an obligation it has met by enactment inter alia of the Environmental 
Affairs Act, No. 449, 1979 La. Acts 1256, which was amended and renamed the 
Environmental Quality Act in 1983. Act No. 97, 1983 La. Acts 270; LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2001 to :2588 (2000). Instead, however, the court held that the 
Natural Resources article was a self-effectuating mandate that imposes a trust duty 
of environmental protection on all state agencies. 
 303. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1156–57. 
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The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal in Blackett v. Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality summarized the factors—known as 
the “IT Factors”—that agencies bestowed with the public trust duty must 
specifically consider.304 The same court then refined the factors again in In 
the Matter of Rubicon, Inc.305 Under the IT Factors, findings of fact and 
reasons for decisions must show whether: 
1) [T]he potential and real adverse environmental effects of the 
proposed project have been avoided to the maximum extent 
possible; 2) a cost benefit analysis of the environmental impact 
costs balanced against the social and economic benefits of the 
project demonstrate that the latter outweighs the former; and 3) 
there are alternative projects or alternative sites or mitigating 
measures which would offer more protection to the environment 
than the proposed project without unduly curtailing non-
environmental benefits to the extent applicable.306 
Save Ourselves indicates that the LDEQ is “the primary public trustee 
of natural resources and the environment in protecting [the public] from 
hazardous waste pollution . . . .”307 All Louisiana appellate decisions that 
have considered the Natural Resources Article have involved attacks against 
decisions of the LDEQ, primarily in disputes involving waste disposal 
facilities.308 To better ensure compliance with Louisiana Supreme Court and 
Louisiana First Circuit holdings, in 1996 the legislature enacted Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 30:2018. The statute requires an applicant for a 
permit from LDEQ for hazardous wastes, solid wastes, water pollutants, or 
air emissions to submit an environmental assessment document that 
addresses the IT Factors verbatim from In re Rubicon.309 If requested, the 
LDEQ must conduct a public hearing on the environmental assessment.310 
                                                                                                             
 304. 506 So. 2d 749, 753–54 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
 305. 670 So. 2d 475 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
 306. Id. at 483. 
 307. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1157. 
 308. See, e.g., Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d 1152 (hazardous waste disposal 
facility); Blackett, 506 So. 2d 749 (solid waste disposal facility); In re Rubicon, 
670 So. 2d 475 (deep well injection hazardous waste disposal); see also In re 
Browning-Ferris Indus. Petit Bois Landfill, 657 So. 2d 633 (La. Ct. App. 1995) 
(solid waste disposal facility); In re Shreveport Sanitary & Indus. Landfill, 521 
So. 2d 710 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (sanitary landfill); Citizens Against Multi-Chem 
v. Dep’t Envtl. Quality, 145 So. 3d 471 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (chemical distribution 
facility). 
 309. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2018(A)–(B) (2000). 
 310. Id. at § 30:2018(C). 
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Applications for “minor” sources of air emissions, hazardous or solid 
wastes, or water discharges are not subject to the statute, although the statute 
states that “[n]othing in this Section shall relieve permit applicants or the 
department from the public trustee requirements” in the Natural Resources 
Article or Save Ourselves.311 
Appellate decisions have focused on the LDEQ as the “primary 
protector” agency, but in its case against the LOC, Abita Springs cited 
several district court decisions that required the LDNR to consider the IT 
Factors.312 The decision of Judge Kelly, however, appears to be the first 
decision relating to a drilling permit that the LOC issued. The LOC chose 
not to make the interesting argument that the IT Factors are wholly 
inapplicable to decisions of the LDNR. The LOC could have argued, for 
example, that by enacting Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:2018, the 
legislature determined that the LDEQ is the agency responsible for 
enforcing the Save Ourselves requirements. Further, the LOC could have 
contended that, by not enacting similar provisions applicable to the LDNR, 
the legislature inferred that LDNR permitting actions are not the type of 
actions that have possible environmental impacts significant enough to 
warrant imposition of the IT Factors.313 The LOC did argue that mineral 
development is different than a waste or saltwater disposal facility. Its 
position, however, was essentially that the LOC had no choice but to permit 
the well because drilling may occur only where minerals are located, and 
the right to explore for and produce minerals is something Louisiana “takes 
very seriously.”314 Thus, under the LOC’s argument, perfunctory 
conclusions satisfy the IT Factor analysis in the case of a drilling permit.315 
The LOC took much more evidence in the Abita Springs case as to 
potential environmental harms than it normally takes because the parties 
                                                                                                             
 311. Id. at § 30:2018(E), (H). Minor sources are defined by LDEQ rules. Id. at (G). 
 312. Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Judicial Review at 13–14, Town of Abita 
Springs v. Welsh, No. 637209 (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 2015). Abita Springs cited no 
cases relating to the granting of a drilling permit. 
 313. The LOC did state in the order itself that the IT Factors were not 
applicable to drilling permits. La. Office of Conservation, Order No. 1577-1, 9 
(Dec. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Drilling Permit Order]. 
 314. Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant’s Petition for Judicial Review 
at 14–15, Town of Abita Springs v. Welsh, No. 637209 (La. Dist. Ct. July 17, 
2015) [hereinafter LOC Opposition Memo]. The LOC also argued, inter alia, that 
the Natural Resources Article does not require that the LOC spell out obvious 
conclusions that should be inferred from the findings in the LOC’s drilling permit 
order. Id. at 15, 17. 
 315. See id. at 13 (“Conservation did not believe that the law required it to 
explain the obvious: Louisiana law establishing mineral rights and common sense 
as to where these minerals are located.”). 
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presented significant evidence in testimony at the hearing to consider the 
Helis permit and in comments, including an expert report from a consultant 
that the Town hired.316 If courts hold the LOC and its permit applicants to 
the same standard as the LDEQ and its applicants under Save Ourselves, one 
may wonder whether the LOC persistently violated the Natural Resources 
Article in other cases that lacked much evidence of potential environmental 
risks. Consider that to support its position that fracking beneath the Southern 
Hills Aquifer in St. Tammany Parish is safe, the LOC noted that oil and gas 
companies had already drilled 73 oil and gas wells in St. Tammany Parish, 
124 oil and gas wells into the Tuscaloosa Marine Shale, and over 27,000 
hydraulically fractured wells in Louisiana.317 Presumably, these permitted 
wells did not receive the same scrutiny as the Helis well.  
Now that the IT Factors have been applied to a drilling permit, local 
governments may have a new avenue to voice their concerns in permitting 
actions that present complex environmental problems, but they must be 
prepared. They must engage counsel and experts, request a hearing, raise 
their issues at the hearing and in comments, and bring legal action to 
challenge decisions for which they disagree. And for a number of reasons, 
Save Ourselves and its progeny do not promise that courts will examine 
potential environmental impacts in all cases where a decision of the LOC 
may have a negative impact on the human environment.318 
First, courts do not need to assess and balance environmental impacts 
under the Natural Resources Article unless parties raised them on the record 
of the administrative proceeding. The Louisiana First Circuit has held that 
an agency only needs to conduct the IT Factor analysis in “contested case[s] 
involving complex issues.”319 Second, even though a court may force an 
agency to better document its findings as to its cost-benefit analysis or its 
consideration of alternatives, courts may be reluctant to require the agency 
to conduct additional hearings or take additional evidence.320 
Third, like reviews conducted by the federal government under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”),321 the courts applying the 
                                                                                                             
 316. See Drilling Permit Order, supra note 313, at 4–8. 
 317. LOC Opposition Memo, supra note 314, at 16. 
 318. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2014); cf. Nat’l Envtl. Pol’y Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(C) (2012). 
 319. In re Rubicon, Inc., 670 So. 2d 475, 486 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (Fogg, J., 
dissenting). This limitation no longer applies to LDEQ major source permitting 
actions. See supra note 308 and accompanying text. 
 320. See, e.g., Oral Reasons to Vacate Helis Permit, supra note 300, at 5. 
 321. See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 
228 (1980) (stating NEPA requires no more than that the agency consider the 
environmental consequences of its decision). 
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Natural Resources Article appear more concerned with documentation and 
disclosure than with the substantive permitting decision that the agency 
made.322 Unlike NEPA, the Natural Resources Article contains a substantive 
standard that requires an agency to make decisions that protect the 
environment, at least insofar as possible. But when one factors the balancing 
aspect of Save Ourselves together with the discretion afforded the agency, 
the outcome of any decision-making process may be largely predetermined. 
This is not to say, however, that challenges cannot result in positive 
substantive environmental mitigation. Due to community outrage and the 
challenges by St. Tammany Parish and the Town of Abita Springs to the 
Helis drilling permit, Helis voluntarily proposed extensive mitigation 
measures for its well that the LOC incorporated into the permit.323 In its 
reexamination of the Helis permit after remand by the district court, the LOC 
could decide to impose additional mitigation measures to support its 
permitting decision and to avoid further appeals. 
Fourth, the IT Factors provide little guidance to both agencies and 
interested persons as to the level of detail required of reviews and findings by 
administrative agencies. Further, the courts have given agencies mixed 
messages. In one case, the First Circuit said that the agency complies with 
its public trustee duty only by “detailing its reasoning . . . .”324 In an earlier 
case, however, the same court said that an order is not invalid if its findings 
and reasons are “implicit in the record” or “self-evident,” which supports 
the LOC position in the Abita Springs case.325 In this sense, the legislature 
should consider its obligation to “enact laws to implement” the article by 
developing more detailed standards to guide the agency decision-making 
process.  
Finally, many local governments may object to the siting of wells but 
may be hesitant to incur the costs to participate in the permitting process 
until a local government or citizens’ group wins an appeal to one of the state 
appellate courts. The LOC argued in the Abita Springs case that the Natural 
Resources Article has little to no application to the LOC because of the 
“obvious” facts that the technology is proven and minerals must be produced 
where they are located.326 In the Abita Springs case, the LOC may choose 
to simply comply with Judge Kelley’s order instead of appealing, and then 
argue again in future cases in reliance on the jurisprudence constante 
                                                                                                             
 322. See, e.g., In re Rubicon, 670 So. 2d at 483 (remanding case to agency for 
the issuance of findings to support exemption from disposal restrictions). 
 323. See Drilling Permit Order, supra note 313, at 12–14. 
 324. In re Rubicon, 670 So. 2d at 482. 
 325. Blackett v. La. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 506 So. 2d 749, 755 (La. Ct. App. 
1987). 
 326. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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doctrine that the LOC has little or no duties under the Natural Resources 
Article.327 
CONCLUSION 
Even strong home rule must yield to significant state interests that create 
real conflicts. State interests in uniformity, the prevention of waste, the 
protection of correlative rights, and implications to the rule of capture make 
limitations on local authority to regulate oil and gas operations necessary. 
But the spirit of the movement that led to home rule suggests that local 
governments should have a meaningful voice in matters that impact their 
local communities. A meaningful local voice not only requires a procedural 
right to raise concerns, but also requires the state to listen and acknowledge 
those concerns and to address reasonable concerns when appropriate. 
Certainly, the state should not be obligated to address all local concerns in a 
substantive manner before issuing a permit. The state would not be overly 
burdened, however, by transparently conveying to the public how the state 
addresses local concerns that it decides to address and its reasons for not 
addressing other concerns that have been raised, particularly when at least 
some local concerns may be addressed in a balanced manner that preserves 
the state’s interest in the production of its resources. 
                                                                                                             
 327. “In Louisiana, courts are not bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, but 
there is a recognition in this State of the doctrine of jurisprudence constante. 
Unlike stare decisis, this latter doctrine does not contemplate adherence to a 
principle of law announced and applied on a single occasion in the past.” Doerr 
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La. 2000) (quoting Johnson v. St. Paul 
Mercury Ins. Co., 236 So. 2d 216, 218 (La. 1970), overruled on other grounds by 
Jagers v. Royal. Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309, 312 (La. 1973)). “Under the civilian 
tradition, while a single decision is not binding on our courts, when a series of 
decisions form a ‘constant stream of uniform and homogenous rulings having the 
same reasoning,’ jurisprudence constante applies and operates with ‘considerable 
persuasive authority.’” Id. (quoting James L. Dennis, Interpretation and 
Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. 
REV. 1, 15 (1993)). This doctrine of jurisprudence constante may encourage 
relitigation until a “constant stream” of legal decisions forecloses a particular 
argument. FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE–SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS § 4.1, 
in 1A LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 50–51 (2005). 
